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# Russian Military Resurgence in the 21st Century: A Case Study

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Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School

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THE FLETCHER SCHOOL  
OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY

Master's of Arts Capstone

# Russian Military Resurgence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

A CASE STUDY

Submitted to Professor Christopher Miller

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Spring 2019

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19 JULY 2019

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In the end of February 2014, the Crimean peninsula of Ukraine was plunged into conflict when pro-Russian separatists began systematically seizing and segregating the peninsula from the Ukrainian government. Working alongside the separatists were the “little green men” or “polite men” as the press dubbed them. Carrying modern Russian Federation military equipment and speaking in Russian, yet wearing masks and no identifying insignia, these men were believed to be regular Russian Federation soldiers working incognito amongst the civil unrest in the interest of the Russian Federation.<sup>1</sup> The world watched in amazement as a well-orchestrated and planned territorial take-over of Crimea began. By the end of March 2014, the Crimean peninsula would, to the objections of Kiev, declare itself independent, and seek and gain admittance to the Russian Federation.

A little over a decade prior, the Russian Federation’s military was scaled back to 10% of the defense activities (e.g. deployments, exercises, training, etc.) which it had been carrying out in 1989 under the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup> Then President Boris Yeltsin had abandoned his country’s capability to engage rivals abroad in lieu of internal security.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, during the breakup of the failed Soviet Union, the Russian Federation retained control of only 50-60% of the USSR’s total force, the remainder being divided (likely simply along the lines of which state it happened to be in at the time of the collapse) among the fourteen newly independent states of the former Union.<sup>4</sup> Further, by 1996, only 5% of the Russian Federation’s forces were fully operable.<sup>5</sup>

These two stories of the same state, separated in time by such a short amount, begs the question – how did this happen? How can a state which spent two decades struggling to rebuild its government, under the pretenses of a peaceful transition and future, emerge in the third decade as a strong, modern, sophisticated, and revisionist state, capable of executing a coordinated invasion of another state? Further, was this event foreseeable? Did the Russian Federation give any clue of its intention or capability? All of these questions have merit and interest; however, this author believes the chief question among them is should the west have seen the Russian military resurgence coming? The answer, quite simply, is yes.

Like almost all complex and interesting events in history, the explanation for the Crimean annexation and the revisionist stance of the Russian Federation today hinges on multiple factors. First, leadership matters. The Russian President since 2000 has been Vladimir Putin, sans his four year period as Dmitry Medvedev’s Prime Minister from 2008-2012. Vladimir Putin’s history and rise to power have deep meaning for the Russian military resurgence. Born to a NKVD veteran of WWII and a career KGB officer himself, Putin embodies many “moscovite” or even Soviet beliefs. Most importantly, he is a strong believer that a unipolar world is an inherently instable system. Putin’s historic example of stability was the Cold War, a bipolar system with the US and the USSR atop competing hierarchies. More recently, the concept of a multipolar system has gained acceptance in the Russian Federation. Russian Foreign Minister,

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<sup>1</sup> Shevchenko, Vitaly. “‘Little Green Men’ or ‘Russian Invaders’?” *BBC News*, BBC, 11 Mar. 2014, [www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154).

<sup>2</sup> Rosefielde, Steven, and Hedlund, Stefan. *Russia since 1980: Wrestling with Westernization*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge UP, 2009. Print. World since 1980. Pg. 127.

<sup>3</sup> Rosefielde, Steven, and Hedlund, Stefan. *Russia since 1980: Wrestling with Westernization*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge UP, 2009. Print. World since 1980. Pg. 128.

<sup>4</sup> Jordan, Amos A, Taylor, William J., and Mazarr, Michael J. *American National Security*. 5th ed. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins UP, 1999. Print. Pg. 352.

<sup>5</sup> Jordan, Amos A, Taylor, William J., and Mazarr, Michael J. *American National Security*. 5th ed. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins UP, 1999. Print. Pg. 353.

Sergei Lavrov was quoted in 2018 as saying, “The United States needs to face the difficult reality that it is no longer the world’s only superpower and adapt to an increasingly multipolar world.”<sup>6</sup> Whether looking historically at a bipolar system or predicting a future of a multipolar system, Putin believes that the system has Moscow as a pole. He believes that internal and external threats to the Russian Federation are linked, working in concert to undermine the interests of the Federation. Finally, he believes in highly centralized control and that the fall of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.”<sup>7</sup> Vladimir Putin’s background and rise to the highest office in the Russian Federation played a significant part in the military resurgence of the Russian Federation.

Second, threats matter. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the west’s security alliance, NATO was the largest successful security alliance in the world. NATO formed as a security alliance to counter Soviet aggression in Europe and North America. From its origins, the power of article V of its charter stood as a bulwark against Soviet military force. “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”<sup>8</sup> While NATO existed to counter Soviet aggression, without a Soviet state in existence, the Russian perception was that NATO now stood to ensure nothing resembling the power the Soviet state possessed could ever be resurrected in Russia again. When NATO began to expand eastward toward, and eventually into, the former Soviet Bloc of Europe, the Russian Federation saw a security threat crawling closer to its borders. The perceived security threat posed by NATO assisted in the Russian Federation’s military resurgence.

Third, world geopolitics matter. No event in history occurs in a vacuum. Everything happens concurrently with other world events and has multiple causes and outcomes due to those events. The early twenty-first century was marked by the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 would shape a significant portion of world geopolitics for the rest of the decade. These changes would herald both new areas of cooperation amongst old adversaries, and would also spark protracted conflict which would revolutionize military strategy and structure. Undoubtedly, this new security environment contributed to the Russian military resurgence; but more importantly, it was the circumstances in which the military resurgence occurred, and therefore the resurgence cannot be analyzed without examining the new security environment concurrently.

Despite this complex web of intertwining narratives, should the west have seen the Russian military resurgence coming? The answer, quite simply, remains yes. Multiple factors, explored in detail in both this case study and the accompanying annexes, were the key indicators

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<sup>6</sup> “U.S. Must Accept a New, Multipolar World Order, Russian Foreign Minister Says.” *Los Angeles Times*, Los Angeles Times, 15 Jan. 2018, [www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-russia-lavrov-20180115-story.html](http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-russia-lavrov-20180115-story.html).

<sup>7</sup> “Europe | Putin Deplores Collapse of USSR.” *BBC News*, BBC, 25 Apr. 2005, [news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm).

<sup>8</sup> Nato. “The North Atlantic Treaty.” *NATO*, [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm).

that the Russian military resurgence, and by extension the military actions in Crimea, were foreseeable.

1. *Who Putin was before politics.* Vladimir Putin was a career KGB officer who dreamed of being a spy. Intelligence and statecraft are intertwined disciplines; however, the KGB was much more than simply an intelligence organization, and its officers were more than just spies.
2. *Putin's record as a bureaucrat in the St. Petersburg and Federal governments.* By all accounts, Putin's rise was aided by his unwavering, and in many ways likely criminal, loyalty to those around him.
3. *The rise of US unilateralism.* In direct conflict with Putin and the Russian Federation's belief in the stable order exists with Moscow as a pole in a non-unipolar system, these actions would affect the security dilemma within the Federation.
4. *Putin's centralization of power within the federal government.* Again, leadership matters, but also the type of leadership in place matters. The erosion of democratic institutions and rise of authoritarian systems within the Federation was the theme of Russian governmental transformation in the beginning of the twenty-first century.
5. *The continued enlargement of NATO.* As previously mentioned, the enlargement of NATO was likely seen as an external threat to the Russian Federation. During the 1999 and 2004 rounds of enlargement this remained mostly an international debate, never sparking more than a "protest in principle" from the Russian Federation government. However, the discussion of Georgia and Ukraine in the NATO alliance was a significant escalation of this perceived threat.
6. *Putin's warnings of 2006 and 2007.* Before his combined Federal Assembly in 2006 and before an international security conference in 2007, Putin laid out his vision of how the world should work, and where it is falling short.
7. *The Russian Federation's actions in Georgia in 2008.* As the first occurrence of the use of Russian forces after Putin's centralization of power, the means and methods employed in Georgia tell a story of Russia's objectives to counter NATO.

This case study is structured to illustrate a conclusion – that the Russian military resurgence was foreseeable by the west. Below are the key indicators and how they should have each shown the west that the Russian Federation was going to resurge, was currently resurging, or had completed its resurgence and ready to or already exercising power beyond its ability a mere ten years earlier. For deeper analysis of these key points, Annexes A-D provide more detailed accounts of the factors which lead to the Russian Federation's revisionist behavior.

*Who Putin was before Politics*  
(Supported in detail by Annex B)

Vadim Bakatin, a former KGB chief once said, "The KGB, as it existed, could not be termed a secret service. It was an organization formed to control and suppress everything and anything. It seemed to be created especially for organizing conspiracies and coups, and it possessed everything necessary to carry them out: its own specially trained armed forces, the capacity to track and control communications, its own people inside all essential organizations, a



monopoly on information, and many other things.”<sup>9</sup> This was the organization which enticed Vladimir Putin from a young age. He sought out employment there and studied law in college, the most likely field from which the KGB would recruit. Putin is even quoted as saying that his affinity for the KGB is how a single Intelligence Officer could “rule over the fates of thousands of people.”<sup>10</sup>

Putin was a loyal KGB officer who had even served on foreign assignment to Europe, a highly desirable opportunity not all KGB officers received. He worked in the “illegal intelligence-gathering unit”, using assumed identities and falsifying documents. Putin was a spy, perhaps not in the romantic spy novel sense, but in his own words he was “a pure and utterly successful product of Soviet patriotic education.”<sup>11</sup> Who Putin was before politics showed his secretive nature and his desire for centralized control within the state.

*Putin’s Record as a Bureaucrat in the St. Petersburg and Federal Governments*  
(Supported in detail by Annex B)

From his start in the mayor’s office in St. Petersburg, Vladimir Putin has shown his true nature as a bureaucrat. In his capacity as deputy mayor to Anatoly Sobchak, Putin oversaw foreign trade and governmental information flow. These functions were traditional to positions given to “active reserve” officers of the KGB. Planted among all institutions in the USSR, the active reserve were a “nearly uncountable and possibly uncounted number”<sup>12</sup> of KGB officers hidden within the civilian structures of the state.

From this posting, Putin over saw a billion dollar natural resource export kickback scheme. His office entered into contractual agreements with companies to export Russia’s natural resources in return for food to be imported to St. Petersburg. When none of the food arrived, a councilwoman of the St. Petersburg government submitted her investigation into Putin. Her findings only accounted for 10% of the Moscow-authorized exports had direct evidence of \$92 million worth of resources and \$34 million in commissions to the third-party companies, and no record of food being delivered to the people of St. Petersburg. Amazingly, Putin survived this investigation, despite it reaching all the way to Boris Yeltsin’s desk.

Putin not only survived the investigation, but was promoted to a position within the federal government in Moscow. He would eventually end up directing the FSB, the state intelligence service which assumed the functions of the KGB after the collapse. Putin’s FSB during this time ensured the political safety of Boris Yeltsin and his closest advisors by blocking investigations into corruption within the Kremlin. Putin’s record as bureaucrat showed his disregard for the rule of law and the people of Russia, and highlighted his favoring of political loyalties and power.

*The Rise of US Unilateralism*

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<sup>9</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 94.

<sup>10</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 59.

<sup>11</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal’ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 42.

<sup>12</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 93.

*(Supported in detail by Annexes C & D)*

Two major acts of US unilateralism in the early twenty-first century lead to a sense of insecurity in the Russian Federation and a build-up of military capability. First, the US decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and to push for the development of a national missile defense (NMD) system sparked concern over the balance between US and Russian strategic forces. Further, once the systems were developed and the US chose to deploy them in Poland and the Czech Republic (later to Romania instead), the Russian Federation saw these systems as designed to neutralize the threat of Russian strategic missile systems. From their vantage, the placement in Eastern Europe could only mean that these systems were intended to counter Russia, despite the US stating that their placement shows that they could not counter Russian Strategic forces.

Second, the US' invasion of Iraq in 2003, while supported by a coalition, was not a UN Security Council approved resolution and therefore, by Russian standards, an unacceptable unilateral action. Putin's long held belief that the true nature of a stable international system was bipolar was in direct conflict with the US taking unilateral actions. Without a Russian "check" to US actions, the world was witnessing an "almost unconstrained hyper use of force – military force – in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts."<sup>13</sup> The rise of US unilateralism showed the increased perceived threat that Putin and the Russian Federation felt.

*Putin's Centralization of Power within the Federal Government*  
*(Supported in detail by Annex D)*

While the Russian Federation had been attempting to implement democracy since the dissolution of the Soviet state, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, many if not all of this work was reversed. In the first two months alone, Putin issued eleven presidential decrees, six of which were military in nature. From removing the no-first-strike policy from Russia's nuclear doctrine, to reinstituting mandatory training for the reserves, Putin began his centralization of power with the reinvigoration of the Russian armed forces.

By 2004, Putin would consolidate all forms of power inside the Russian Federation. By forcing the CEOs of large energy companies to turn over control of their companies to the state, Putin seized the most lucrative economic resource in Russia. By extending the same tactic to the media moguls, Putin grabbed control of the television channels and newspaper outlets and by extension the information flow in the country. By instituting proportional representation elections in the Duma, shifting the Federal Council to appointees, planting presidential appointees as envoys to oversee the regional governors, and creating the Public Chamber to review legislation before it was passed to the Duma, Putin secured end-to-end control of the political machine in Russia. Putin's centralization of power showed him executing a plan to dismantle democracy and install authoritarian control in the Russian Federation.

*The Continued Enlargement of NATO*  
*(Supported in detail by Annexes A, C, & D)*

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<sup>13</sup> "Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 12 Feb. 2007, [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on).

The expansion, as is phrased in Russian terms, of NATO is the expansion of a threat to the Russian Federation, as seen from the Russian perspective. NATO was the security alliance to counter Soviet aggression in Europe, and the perspective of the Russian Federation that it existed after the collapse of the Soviet Union only to ensure that the Russian Federation remains weak is easily understandable. Much was done on the part of NATO and the US to work with, not against, the Russian Federation; however, much was also done which was instigative.

NATO, while discussing the enlargement of including Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, in the 1990s, sought to engage the Russian Federation as an equal. NATO and the Russian Federation found the common ground in Bosnia. Working side-by-side, these two once sworn enemies were able to interoperate for the sake of European security. Unfortunately, this was short lived. When NATO conducted its second round of enlargement, culminating in the admission of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004, the Russian Federation now felt a push against its border from the Cold War alliance.

Continuing its plans eastward, NATO again pursued a path of high irritability to the Russian Federation. In 2005, NATO began discussion of extending membership to Ukraine and Georgia, something that was just intolerable to the Russian Federation. The continued enlargement of NATO was another example of the increased perceived threat to the Russian Federation.

*Putin's Warnings of 2006 and 2007*  
(Supported in detail by Annex D)

In the event that the Russian military resurgence or the growing displeasure from the Kremlin was not clear to the west, Vladimir Putin clearly gave warnings of the future in 2006 and 2007. First, to his own combined Federal Council and Duma, the Federal Assembly, Putin outlined his complaints with the west's actions. Hinging on the continued NATO expansion, the rising unilateralism of the US, and the claims of space-based weaponry development, Putin's warning was underscored by his subtext – the Russian Federation is not being treated as the equal it perceived itself to be in a bipolar system it believed to exist.

In 2007, before the 43<sup>rd</sup> annual Munich conference on security policy, Putin laid these complaints out for the world leaders. "I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?"<sup>14</sup> After discussing the changes to the international security situation, Putin said two short and clear indications of the resurgence of a revisionist Russia. On the heels of describing how a unipolar world is undemocratic by lending itself to unilateralism, Putin said "of course, such a policy stimulates and arms race" and "It is obvious that in these conditions we must think about ensuring our own security."<sup>15</sup> Putin's warnings of 2006 and 2007 were clear articulations that the Russian

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<sup>14</sup> "Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 12 Feb. 2007, [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on).

<sup>15</sup> "Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy." *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 12 Feb. 2007, [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on).

Federation was willing to act on behalf of its national interests and that many of those national interests are not in line with the interests of the west.

*The Russian Federation's Actions in Georgia in 2008*  
(Supported in detail by Annex D)

Regardless of the prior indications and warnings of the Russian military resurgence, the Georgian War in 2008 should have been the ultimate guide post of future Russian actions. While courting NATO membership, Georgia began to use its forces to maintain peace in two of its semi-autonomous regions – Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia deployed its forces into the region after stating that ethnic Russians were being mistreated and that Russian Peacekeeping forces had suffered casualties at the hands of Georgian forces. Correct or not, it is the actions taken by Russia after the deployment of these forces that matters.

First, the Russian forces in the regions began to systematically destroy captured Georgian military equipment. Next, Russia formally recognized both regions as sovereign states and began diplomatic relations with them. These two acts, regardless of any others, created two conditions for Georgia. First, it hampered their ability to contribute militarily to NATO provided they had been admitted. Second, for good measure, by formally recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign states, Georgia was immediately involved in a border dispute. The Russian Federation, by military action of swift politics scuttled any possibility of NATO expansion on its southern border. The Russian Federation's actions in Georgia showed that the resurgence of the Russian military was complete enough for the Federation to begin using force to counter the west's plans when they conflicted with the national interests of the Russian Federation.

*Conclusion*

In February 2014, the Russian Federation invaded the Crimean peninsula, seizing military bases and equipment, and created an immediate border dispute for Ukraine. Just as the Federation had done six years prior in the caucuses, Ukraine's eligibility to draw closer to the west and its possibility of joining NATO were crushed.

This event was a surprise to many in the world, but as this case study shows it should not have been. A Gallup poll taken from 2008 to 2019 showed the "awakening" that the Crimean annexation brought to the west. When asked "what one country anywhere in the world do you consider to be the US greatest enemy today?", the responses were indicative of this awakening. In 2008, only 2% of respondents felt as though the answer was Russia; however, in 2015, 18% now felt Russia was the US' greatest threat. Interestingly, where was the threat in 2008 according to this poll? A combined 47% said the threat was from Iran or Iraq.<sup>16</sup> This surge in the perception of Russian threat shows that the key indicators of the first decade of the twenty-first century were largely overlooked or outright ignored by the west.

The Russian military resurgence of the twenty-first century was not a secretive effort, nor was it something that should have taken the west by surprise. Many factors led to not only why the Russian military resurged, but also as to why the west was blind-sided by it. Leadership, specifically Vladimir Putin, truly matters. Without his KGB trained personality and desire for centralized control, it may not have been possible to rebuild the Russian military. Threats,

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<sup>16</sup> Gallup, Inc. "Russia." *Gallup.com*, [news.gallup.com/poll/1642/Russia.aspx](https://news.gallup.com/poll/1642/Russia.aspx).

specifically NATO enlargement, matters. Without the perceived provocation from an external threat, Putin would likely have never been able to consolidate power as aggressively as he did, nor would he have likely been able to spend so much on defense budgets without public backlash. Finally, world geopolitics, specifically the GWOT, truly matters. The US and NATO spend almost the entire first decade of the twenty-first century engaged in a war against global terrorism. The required focus on the asymmetric threats and challenges posed by global terrorism left little bandwidth remaining for the contemplation of a possible resurgent Russia. Further, by branding itself a partner in the GWOT, the Russian Federation found common ground with the west and used this cooperation as leverage against outside influence and criticism as well as internal leverage for defense spending and the centralization of control.

Leadership, threats, and geopolitics help provide and answer as to why the Russian Federation resurged militarily in the twenty-first century, but the question as to why it seemed to blind-side the west is far more challenging. As this case study shows, multiple key indications lead up to the resurgent Russian military of the 2010's. Who Vladimir Putin was before his political career, his handling of politics and the power of his governmental postings, the increased unilateralism by the US during the GWOT, Putin's near-complete consolidation of power as president of the Russian Federation, and NATO's continued push eastward in its ideological attempt to unite Europe under a security alliance should have been strong enough indicators of the pending future. Yet, surprisingly, they were not heeded, and even more indicators were given. Putin gave clear warning of his ideals differing greatly from the common values held at the time in the west not once, but twice. Finally, the Georgian War of 2008 showed that the Russian Federation was capable to now act in its interests via the use of force and was willing to do so, even if those interests conflicted with the west's plans or interests.

## **Annex A - Why Did NATO Enlarge?**

Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany, the first decision for the west was the terms of German unification. Associated closely with the question of reunifying Germany was the understanding that with the unification, the eastern boarder of NATO would expand toward the Soviet Union. It is contested as to whether the west gave assurances to the Soviet Union during the German unification that the eastern front of NATO would or would not expand any further. In 1990, Secretary of State James Baker stated “NATO would not expand one inch to the east”. However, as Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shiffrinson and Mark Kramer debated in 2017, with the remainder of the Warsaw Pact in place at the time of the quote, it is difficult to determine if Secretary Baker was pledging to not expand NATO past Germany or if the thought of NATO east of Germany was even in the minds of leaders in the east or west and therefore, not a pledge at all.<sup>17</sup> Regardless of the possibility of a pledge, the west would come to a debate concerning the enlargement of NATO after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union.

With a Russian Federation in transition from the years of Soviet governance, yet still militarily strong and still very much a nuclear power, the decision to enlarge the security architecture built in 1949 to counter Soviet aggression eastward was not a light one. Specifically, 50-60% of the former Red Army was under direct control of the Russian Federation.<sup>18</sup> Two competing thoughts sat on the sides of this debate. First, the non-expansionist idea was that any increase to the territory of NATO would undoubtedly frustrate the Russian Federation. More liberal interpretations of this idea believed that enlargement was possible, but not in isolation from NATO working more closely with the Russian Federation. On the opposite side, history showed that if a power vacuum existed in Central and Eastern Europe, then old alliances would be likely to form resulting in a despotic balance of power style structure. Adding to the seriousness of this thought, the aforementioned statistic works in reverse, 40-50% of the former Red Army was now divided among fourteen newly independent states, a majority of which were in Eastern Europe. The more liberal interpretations of this side of the debate believed that while full NATO membership was likely too aggressive to stand for Russia, that a middle ground approach needed to be developed in order to not allow the balance of power structure to surface again in Central and Eastern Europe. This path came to fruition via the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the establishment of state “requirements” for NATO membership consideration.

Since the enlargement of NATO today is of historic fact, the question exists as to what was the critical reason why the expansionist ideal won out? The first theory to be explored here is that the German-championed thought that without NATO enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe, a power vacuum would manifest and lower the security of the continent further than an infuriated Russia. The competing theory is that the PfP and “requirements” set forth for NATO membership, once achieved by prospective NATO members, pinned the existing NATO states into allowing membership or risk international embarrassment for both the rejected state and NATO as a whole. This analysis will flesh out these two ideas and make a case for which is

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<sup>17</sup> Itzkowitz Shiffrinson, Joshua R. “NATO Enlargement—Was There a Promise?” *International Security*, vol. 42 no. 1, 2017, pp. 189-192. *Project MUSE*, [www.muse.jhu.edu/article/667396](http://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/667396).

<sup>18</sup> Jordan, Amos A, Taylor, William J., and Mazarr, Michael J. *American National Security*. 5th ed. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins UP, 1999. Print. Pg. 352.

the most likely single reason for the NATO enlargement following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

### ***Part I – 1999 NATO Enlargement***

#### *The Power Vacuum Theory*

After Germany was reunited, NATO spanned from the Atlantic to the edge of Central Europe. Russia, again still relatively strong and still nuclear-capable, was retrenched behind its own borders. The void of Central and Eastern Europe was now littered with independent states like Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Hungary, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Bulgaria. These states had historic roots in existence, many of them had existed prior to World War Two and World War One. However, since the establishment of the Eastern Bloc and the Warsaw Pact, these states have been run as satellites of the USSR and therefore were under the collective security arrangements of the Warsaw Pact and the nuclear umbrella of the Soviet Union. Now, for the first time in fifty to eighty years, these states emerged as independent and began to seek their own security.

As it stood in the early 1990's, Central and Eastern Europe, without an invitation to join the largest and only surviving security organization in Europe would organize themselves along "balance of power" lines. In Germany, this thought was prevalent. As Eyal states, "Bereft of any serious institutional affiliation, the countries of the region would begin to construct their own security arrangements. What would these arrangements have looked like? Very likely they would have resembled the ones which had already plunged Europe into two world wars in this century: Poland and Romania (the two biggest countries in the region) against Russia, Slovakia and Romania against Hungary, and the Czechs with the Poles in order to deflect Germany's influence."<sup>19</sup> Germany, with its keen historical understanding of Central and Eastern Europe (ironically earned from their thrice exploitation of the region for the benefit of Germany since 1870) was a champion of this thought. The alternative to offering these new independent states the protection from not only outside aggression but from inter-region conflict amongst each other via NATO was historically unpalatable to German politicians. "Germany would have then been faced with the option of either participating in Central Europe's local alliances or reaching a deal with Moscow in order to keep the region under control"<sup>20</sup>. The unwieldy nature of multiple unilateral alliances was not an ideal situation, especially considering that it was one of the leading causes to hurtling Europe into World War One (and to a lesser, but still important, effect World War Two). Alternatively, Germany engaging the Soviet Union to ensure the two could manage and "control" Central and Eastern Europe under a pair of agreed upon spheres of influence felt strikingly similar to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939.

Germany saw the problematic future of Central and Eastern Europe, was geographically positioned on its boarder, and through an astute understanding of European history pushed the NATO alliance to expand into these states. Volker Ruhe, Defense Minister of Germany, wrote in the *NATO Review* in June of 1993, "To me, that is no longer a question of principle but rather one of timing and of the conceptual framework. What we need is a clear understanding of our

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<sup>19</sup> Eyal, Jonathan. "NATO'S Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision." *International Affairs* 73.4 (1997): 695-719. Web. Pg. 703.

<sup>20</sup> Eyal, Jonathan. "NATO'S Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision." *International Affairs* 73.4 (1997): 695-719. Web. Pg. 703.

common interests, values and political ideas. Our aim must be to fill the security policy vacuum to the East of NATO and to enhance stability throughout the region.”<sup>21</sup>

While Germany was a prime foothold of this thought, it was not alone. The concept that Central and Eastern Europe needed inclusion in NATO else they would fall into precarious local alliances and turmoil was held in the US and the former Eastern Bloc as well. Henry Kissinger wrote in 1994 that “Failure to expand NATO in the near future is likely to prove irrevocable. Russian opposition is bound to grow as its economy gains strength; the nations of Central Europe may drift out of their association with Europe. The end result would be the vacuum between Germany and Russia that has tempted so many previous conflicts.”<sup>22</sup> Here to, like in Germany, an elder statesman of the United States sees the future problem of leaving Central and Eastern Europe to devise its own form of security structure. Interestingly, Kissinger recommends that NATO not just pursue the inclusion of certain former Warsaw Pact states (i.e. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary – the “Visegrad” countries), but also a treaty of non-aggression between NATO and Russia.<sup>23</sup> This is the same thought that was historically impossible for Germany to act upon unilaterally, due to its semblance of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. However, if pursued as a “whole of Europe” approach, might have a level of credibility the German state was unable to produce.

This thought even looked like it would come to fruition in 1994, when the Russian Federation signed on to the PfP.<sup>24</sup> The PfP was founded in January 1994 with a dream that “partners would see ethnic wars like the one in Bosnia as a common security problem and would cooperate as partners solving it, rather than designating proxies and taking sides as in the Cold War”.<sup>25</sup> In the Bosnian conflict in 1995, the unthinkable actions of the Cold War were made real. Russian forces worked alongside NATO forces. Through rather clever statesmanship and military-to-military connections, Russia’s role in Bosnia (specifically, within the NATO mission in Bosnia) was established in mutually agreeable terms. NATO was concerned about the “unity of command”, meaning that ultimately all forces in a region and under a mission would report to a common leader. The idea of Russian forces taking direct orders from western officers was unpalatable. Colonel General Shevtsov and General Joulwan worked the details smartly, the Russians would be under the operational control (OPCON - the assignment of missions and rules of engagement) of General Joulwan, like the rest of the NATO contingent, but via Colonel General Shevtsov and therefore outside of the normal NATO channels; however, the Russians would be under the tactical control (TACON – the minute-by-minute orders to accomplish tasks given via OPCON) of Major General Nash, who commanded a multinational force of Russian, American, and other NATO forces.<sup>26</sup> This provided the unity of command that NATO demanded, but allowed the Russians to assign their own forces and operate “with, not under”

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<sup>21</sup> Ruhe, Volker. “Europe and the Alliance: Key Factors for Peace and Stability.” *NATO Review*, vol. 41, no. 3, June 1993, pp. 15.

<sup>22</sup> “Expand NATO Now.” *The Washington Post (1974-Current File)* [Washington, D.C.] 1994: A27. Web. Pg. 5.

<sup>23</sup> “Expand NATO Now.” *The Washington Post (1974-Current File)* [Washington, D.C.] 1994: A27. Web. Pg. 4.

<sup>24</sup> Nato. “Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document (Country, Name & Date).” NATO, 10 Jan. 2012, [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_82584.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_82584.htm).

<sup>25</sup> Carter, Ashton B., Carter, Ashton B., and Perry, William James. *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999. Print. Pg. 24.

<sup>26</sup> Carter, Ashton B., Carter, Ashton B., and Perry, William James. *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999. Print. Pg. 44.



NATO in their eyes.<sup>27</sup> Just ten years prior, the thought of Russian forces working with NATO would have been absurd; yet, here in the middle of a Slavic-Muslim-Croat ethnic conflict true cooperation between former Cold War adversaries was occurring and the PfP was working.

In the former Eastern Bloc, Romania stood out in 1993, when Dr. Teodor Melescanu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, wrote in the *NATO Review* about the rising violence which existed in the Balkans and the role which Romania and other potential NATO members played in controlling it. “None of the new democracies bordering former Yugoslavia - Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania - should be punished by neglect. Each of them has played an important part in preventing the war from spreading throughout the area and beyond. These states' ability to preserve - against heavy odds - their domestic stability, and their contribution to the international efforts to curb and stop the conflict, should not be overlooked.”<sup>28</sup> Dr. Melescanu was showing two things of importance in the power vacuum theory. First, that the power vacuum already existed and that violence due to that vacuum had already broken out. And second, noble democratic states (including Romania) were on the front lines of containing the violence in a manner consistent with NATO norms and values.

The rebuttals to the power vacuum theory are difficult to flesh out, since NATO began the PfP in 1994 and admitted new states into its membership ranks in 1999, thus filling the power vacuum within a few years of its creation. However, Kissinger points out the downside risk that expansion would alienate Russia.<sup>29</sup> This overarching fear is somewhat dissuade due to President Boris Yeltsin's letter to President Bill Clinton in 1993. “We understand, of course, that any possible integration of east European countries into NATO will not automatically lead to the alliance somehow turning against Russia. NATO is not being viewed as a bloc in opposition to us. [...] In the long run, it should probably not be ruled out that even we would join NATO.”<sup>30</sup> It is plausible to stand in the shoes of current leaders in the early 1990s and see the danger of a power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe as greater than the reaction of Russia's elite to NATO enlargement.

### *The Path to Membership Forcing Acceptance Theory*

The competing theory of NATO enlargement is that once NATO outlined its “requirements” for membership and prospective states achieved those requirements, NATO was forced to expand or suffer international backlash and credibility issues. This started with the PfP. While the PfP has never described itself as a path to membership, it does brand itself that way. “The PfP was established in 1994 to enable participants to develop an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation, and the level and *pace of progress*.”<sup>31</sup> The idea of “pace of progress” is a path to “progressing” to membership. Even the 1993 Strategy for NATO Expansion outlined that the North Atlantic Cooperation Council

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<sup>27</sup> Carter, Ashton B., Carter, Ashton B, and Perry, William James. *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999. Print. Pg. 44.

<sup>28</sup> Melescanu, Teodor. "Security in Central Europe: A Positive-Sum Game." *NATO Review* 10 1993: 12. ProQuest. Web. 5 May 2019. Pg. 14.

<sup>29</sup> "Expand NATO Now." *The Washington Post (1974-Current File)* [Washington, D.C.] 1994: A27. Web. Pg. 4.

<sup>30</sup> “Retranslation of Yeltsin Letter on NATO Expansion.” Translated by Marvin Russell, *The National Security Archive*, 15 June 2015, [www.nsarchive2.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4390818-Document-04-Retranslation-of-Yeltsin-letter-on](http://www.nsarchive2.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4390818-Document-04-Retranslation-of-Yeltsin-letter-on).

<sup>31</sup> Nato, “Partnership for Peace Programme.” NATO, 7 June 2017, [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_50349.htm#](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm#).

(NACC) should be consulted with during the process of expansion.<sup>32</sup> The NACC was formed in 1991 to begin the dialogue between NATO and “partner” states of the former Warsaw Pact. According to the NATO 1995 Study on Enlargement, the following tenants must be met for membership into NATO: “a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; the fair treatment of minority populations; a commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts; the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures.”<sup>33</sup>

The example of this theory was Romania, specifically their bid for acceptance into NATO at the same time as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. In 1996, the Romanian government actively pursued membership in NATO under the guidelines of the 1995 study on Enlargement. As Eyal illustrates, “Romania took NATO's membership conditions at face value, and proceeded to dispose of every objection which the Alliance raised in its path.”<sup>34</sup> Romania had launched a campaign to meet the NATO requirements and be the first in line to full membership. Three years prior, Dr. Melescanu wrote “we are quite aware that no decision can be implemented without the support of public opinion in the Alliance's member states. Those of us in the Cold War's 'forgotten' part of Europe can therefore help in better acquainting our Western friends with our security needs and concerns, and also with the way in which our eventual membership could serve NATO's values and goals.”<sup>35</sup> Romania was making the ultimate play, under not only the “rules” set forth by NATO and the NACC, but also in the political and public diplomacy domains. They understood, as Dr. Melescanu said the importance of the “support of public opinion” of the member states. Romania at this time sent their exiled king, Michael, on a tour of European capitals in order to drum up publicity and public support.<sup>36</sup> It seemed that all of the requirements were checked and Romania would soon be on the ballot for membership.

However, as Dr. Melescanu said, public opinion of the member states matters. Any enlargement to NATO would require ratification by the member states governments. Again, it seemed as though Romania had achieved support. The French supported the Romanian request very quickly, and was shortly followed by Greece, Turkey, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and Canada.<sup>37</sup> Unfortunately, the United States was a holdout in support for Romanian membership. Instead, the US threw three other states in the ring for consideration, all of whom had obtained the NATO “requirements” – The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The rationale for these states is two fold. First, they had been pursuing a closer relationship with NATO since at least 1992, as Lubos Dobrovsky, the Czechoslovak Defense Minister was quoted as saying in *NATO Review* – “Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary are very serious in applying for membership of NATO, but NATO hesitates, sets conditions and time limits and generally carries on as if the whole thing were a misunderstanding, regardless of the fact that we, like Poland and Hungary,

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<sup>32</sup> Davis. “Strategy for NATO's Expansion and Transformation.” *The National Security Archive*, 7 July 2004, [www.nsarchive2.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4390816-Document-02-Strategy-for-NATO-s-Expansion-and](http://www.nsarchive2.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4390816-Document-02-Strategy-for-NATO-s-Expansion-and). Pg. 4.

<sup>33</sup> Nato. “Enlargement.” NATO, 15 Feb. 2019, [www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49212.htm?selectedLocale=en#](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm?selectedLocale=en#).

<sup>34</sup> Eyal, Jonathan. “NATO'S Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision.” *International Affairs* 73.4 (1997): 695-719. Web. Pg. 708.

<sup>35</sup> Melescanu, Teodor. “Security in Central Europe: A Positive-Sum Game.” *NATO Review* 10 1993: 12. ProQuest. Web. 5 May 2019. Pg. 12.

<sup>36</sup> Eyal, Jonathan. “NATO'S Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision.” *International Affairs* 73.4 (1997): 695-719. Web. Pg. 708.

<sup>37</sup> Eyal, Jonathan. “NATO'S Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision.” *International Affairs* 73.4 (1997): 695-719. Web. pg. 708.

have made it unequivocally known that we regard NATO as an important stabilizing element in Europe.”<sup>38</sup> By 1996, when Romania was adhering to the rules of NATO to garner public support for membership, these three states had been pushing for years. Hence, why US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced that these three states would be supported before Romania because “applicant countries must meet the criteria for a longer period of time than a few months.”<sup>39</sup> Regardless, it would take until 1999 for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to achieve full membership, at least seven years after their initial push to do so. Romania would follow in the next round of admissions in 2004, approximately eight years after its initial bid.

The rebuttal to the path to membership forcing acceptance theory is murky, like the power vacuum theory, since the states which bid for acceptance were accepted. Additionally, these states were accepted along similar timelines from their initial bids and attainments of the requirements set forth in the 1995 Study on Enlargement. However, because there doesn’t seem to exist any specific backlash to the initial rejection of states which completed the requirements like a checklist, this theory appears to fall apart when viewed across a longer time period.

## ***Part II – 2004 NATO Enlargement***

In 2002, NATO announced that it would begin a new round of admissions for membership to include seven states. Most controversially, this included states which were part of the former Soviet Bloc.<sup>40</sup> Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were all issued Membership Action Plans. All of these states had existed within the Soviet sphere of influence during the Cold War, whether directly as Soviet territory or as states under Communist Party rule. These states were in keeping with the NATO membership “requirements”, but the question stands a why would NATO pursue another enlargement which would undoubtedly alienate the Russian Federation, which as of this time began waning in its PfP participation (a possible sign of distancing from its relationship with NATO)? As of 1999, former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs Ash Carter said, “Russia has only seldom and reluctantly joined in these activities [PfP military-to-military activities], and it has not taken the lead in forging relationships with the militaries that have taken the place of its former Warsaw Pact allies.”<sup>41</sup>

Two theories contend here for the historical rationale of the second round of enlargement. First, the theory that the US believed the Russian Federation to be a pseudo-partner in global affairs, but by no means a peer, and would only oppose the enlargement in principle. With the recent and/or concurrent successes of the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) it stands to reason that the Russian Federation would seek to accept the US decisions, even if they opposed them in principle. Second, the theory that the US pursued the new enlargement under a budding concept of the “freedom agenda” and without much strategic consideration or understanding of the consequences. The US at the time was working fairly well with the Russian Federation as

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<sup>38</sup> Pick, Otto. "Reassuring Eastern Europe." *NATO Review* 04 1992: 27. ProQuest. Web. 5 May 2019. Pg. 30.

<sup>39</sup> Eyal, Jonathan. "NATO'S Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision." *International Affairs* 73.4 (1997): 695-719. Web. pg. 710.

<sup>40</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 99.

<sup>41</sup> Carter, Ashton B., Carter, Ashton B, and Perry, William James. *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999. Print. Pg. 59-60.

mentioned above in terms of arms control, and President Bush put great emphasis on his personal relationships, describing Putin as “an honest, straightforward man who loves his country” and Bush felt as though he had “a sense of his soul”.<sup>42</sup> These facts lead one to see that the US may have been inclined to push foreign policy which, likely provocational to the Russian Federation, satisfied US interests without great concern for peer or other great powers interests in mind.

### *Pseudo-Partner in Global Affairs Theory*

The ABM treaty of 1972 stated that a comprehensive, national missile defense (NMD) system was illegal for either the US or the USSR (and by de facto after 1991, the Russian Federation) to possess. The treaty was a pledge in the Cold War from both sides that neither would seek to undermine the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) principle. Since the declaration by President Reagan to develop such a system, the US plans to do so were never truly realized or abandoned by either subsequent presidents George H.W. Bush, or Bill Clinton.<sup>43</sup>

While campaigning for his presidency, George W. Bush said that Russia was “a great power and must always be treated as such”.<sup>44</sup> With relation to the ABM treaty, he campaigned comparatively to this thought saying that while he was in favor of developing a NMD system, he wished to amend the treaty in consultation with Russia. However, he went further saying that “if Russia refuses the changes we propose, we will give prompt notice, under the provisions of the treaty, that we can no longer be a party to it.”<sup>45</sup> Regardless, in December 2001, likely hastened by the rapidly changing security situation after 9/11, the US announced that it was unilaterally abrogating from the ABM treaty.<sup>46</sup> Interestingly, instead of sparking hardline rhetoric akin to the days of the Cold War, Putin’s response to the abrogation was that “I fully believe that the decision taken by the president of the United States does not pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation”.<sup>47</sup> Multiple authors believe this to be a sign that at least some, if not significant, effort had been taken prior to the statement by President Bush to ensure the Russian President would disagree in principle, but not outwardly chill the U.S.-Russian relationship.

Another shining example of U.S.-Russian relations at the time was the cooperation over a shared enemy, global terrorism. Vladimir Putin’s leadership came front stage during the Russian counter-terrorism (CT) efforts in Chechnya during the fall of 1999. After a Saudi-born Islamist launched a 1500 man attack into Dagestan in the Caucasus Region, Russian President Boris Yeltsin promoted a little known FSB Director, Vladimir Putin, to the position of Prime Minister to “tackle the problem” in Chechnya.<sup>48</sup> A more detailed analysis of Putin’s origins and rise to

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<sup>42</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 91.

<sup>43</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 90.

<sup>44</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 91.

<sup>45</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 91.

<sup>46</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 91.

<sup>47</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 92.

<sup>48</sup> Roxburgh, Angus. *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print. Pg. 21.

power are explored in Annex C. When the US began exploring options to destroy al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan who harbored them, they found a friend in Putin, who had been branded as a “hero” against terrorism in Chechnya during his presidential campaign in 1999, and the Russian Federation. Geographically, Russia was able to provide overflight rights directly into Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan territory, the central Asian states from which the US would launch its campaign.<sup>49</sup> While the Russian’s felt as though these states were within their sphere of influence, as former Soviet SSRs, the US never formally recognized such a fact. However, deference was given by the US during the CT campaign by seeking Russian Federation agreement to US basing military forces in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.<sup>50</sup>

Through these foreign policies, it can be seen that the US treated the Russian Federation as a partner in global affairs, ranging from arms control and nuclear deterrence to CT and the fight against global terrorism. However, it can equally be articulated that the US did not see the Russian Federation as a hurdle to foreign policy, one which acquiescence must be achieved before any action can be taken as was much more the case with the USSR during the Cold War. Logically, to the point of NATO’s second round of enlargement, it is plausible that the US saw the issue as achievable despite likely Russian objection. With so many areas where the US was able to achieve its goals and carry out its desired actions without anything more than a “protest in principle” from the Russian Federation, why would the enlargement of NATO (a security alliance to which the Russian Federation was a PfP member) cause any greater a negative reaction?

#### *“Freedom Agenda” without Strategic Consideration and/or Understanding Theory*

The “Freedom Agenda” wasn’t fully branded, named, and articulated until sometime in 2004 leading up to George W. Bush’s second presidential election; however, the thoughts that composed it were developing prior to that in President Bush’s first term and therefore during the second round of NATO enlargement. President Bush summarized the Freedom Agenda in that “freedom is not this country’s gift to the world; freedom is the Almighty’s gift to every man and woman in this world. And as the greatest power on the face of the Earth, we have an obligation to help the spread of freedom.”<sup>51</sup> This statement by the President has two elements worth considering. First, it is said in a Messianic, “light vs. dark” tone, one which would not just galvanize a right-wing American voting base, but also one that comes from a deeper part of someone’s belief structure. Second, when compared to the NATO requirements for membership, it is easily applicable, because NATO membership carried with it the ideals of democracy and peaceful coexistence within the Alliance.

President Bush long held Christian views as part of his basis of belief structure. As pertaining to his relationship with Putin, Bush had two examples from 2001 that showed even then he held these Christian values closely. First, in his meeting with Putin in Slovenia, he spoke

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<sup>49</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 93.

<sup>50</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 93.

<sup>51</sup> Peters, Bernard, and John T Woolley. “The President's News Conference.” The President's News Conference | The American Presidency Project, 13 Apr. 2004, [www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-1104](http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-1104).

of “getting a sense of his soul”.<sup>52</sup> He didn’t say he got a sense of his character or his ideals, he said a sense of his soul. Second, during the same meeting, President Bush recounted a moment with Putin where the Russian Federation president showed him a crucifix given to him by his mother.<sup>53</sup> The symbolism of the Christian values and the aforementioned value of his personal relationship with Vladimir Putin shows how deeply seated these beliefs were in President Bush’s character.

The NATO requirements for membership include “a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; the fair treatment of minority populations; a commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts” as its first three tenets.<sup>54</sup> “Freedom” and “democracy” are often interchangeable in American political dialogue, the care for your fellow man is a mainstay Christian value, and the peaceful resolution of conflict is the third and reason for NATO’s existence, as outlined by William Perry and Ash Carter in *Preventive Defense* – “NATO’s historic role of drawing members together, encouraging them to resolve disputes peacefully, and fostering respect for democratic values and institutions.”<sup>55</sup> These similarities lend themselves to the conclusion that the US’ decision to push for the second round of NATO enlargement was in line with the flourishing Freedom Agenda, as the idea would soon come to be called.

Whether the Bush Administration conducted foreign policy without strategic consideration or understanding of other states’ interests is again an idea which fully manifests after the conclusion of the second round of NATO enlargement, yet had multiple ties to the 2000-2003 timeframe. Looking back at the “Pseudo-Partner in Global Affairs” theory, the string of successes the US had in gaining in its national interests with very little, if any, ramification from the Russian Federation is evident. Additionally, the focus of the Bush Administration was clearly on the GWOT, not on a great power competition with Russia. A more detailed analysis of the US’ strategic focus from 2000-2010 is located in Annex D. “During the period 2001-2003, senior Bush administration officials, from the president down, had little to say about political conditions inside Russia. After 9/11, maintaining cooperation in the ‘War on Terror’ clearly took precedence.”<sup>56</sup> During this time, the administration must have been feeling a sense of success as well. As noted after President Bush won reelection in 2004, “[President Bush] had denied al Qaeda a safe haven. He had unseated the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. Afghanis and Iraqis had voted in free elections. [...] Relations with China, Russia, and India were good. More than three and a half years had passed without a new terrorist attack on U.S. soil. In Bush’s mind, the American people had witnessed these successes and rewarded him for it.”<sup>57</sup>

The building confidence in a leader who has achieved so many of his foreign policy aims with such a little amount of retort from great powers like the Russian Federation must steadily increase the penchant of the leader to act without concern for the great power’s consideration. It is feasible to think that with the addition of each foreign policy success which the US completed

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<sup>52</sup> Daalder, Ivo H, and Lindsay, James M. *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2005. Print. Pg. 63.

<sup>53</sup> Daalder, Ivo H, and Lindsay, James M. *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2005. Print. Pg. 63.

<sup>54</sup> Nato. “Enlargement.” NATO, 15 Feb. 2019, [www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49212.htm?selectedLocale=en#](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm?selectedLocale=en#).

<sup>55</sup> Carter, Ashton B., Carter, Ashton B, and Perry, William James. *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999. Print. Pg. 56.

<sup>56</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 94.

<sup>57</sup> Daalder, Ivo H, and Lindsay, James M. *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2005. Print. Pg. 201.



without a reaction greater than “disagreement in principle” from the Russian Federation eventually lead to a bolder belief that the Russian Federation would very rarely, if ever, take action opposing the US’ actions. For this reason, it is logical to see the budding concept of the Freedom Agenda being pushed unilaterally without a concern or understanding of the greater geopolitical consequences.

A clear rebuttal to this theory are the actions of 2004 and the Ukrainian political crisis. It was widely held that the Russian Federation was tempering in the Ukrainian presidential election in favor of the Russian-leaning candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, including a possible poisoning attempt on the EU/US-leaning candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. The Russians believed that the US interfered in the election on behalf of Yushchenko, allowing his victory in a run-off.<sup>58</sup> While this seems to support rather than refute the theory, the rhetoric after concerning Russia from the administration could hardly been seen as anything which would have been believed to elicit simply a “oppose in principle” response. President Bush said “Vladimir is going to have to make some hard choices, and I think it’s very important for the American President as well as other Western leaders to remind him of the great benefits of democracy.”<sup>59</sup> He went further following his own reelection in the US saying “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goals of ending tyranny in our world.”<sup>60</sup> It is almost undoubtable that the Russian president took this to mean that Ukraine is a democracy under the protection of the US’ Freedom Agenda and that he is a tyrant. Both of these conclusions would prove too far to “oppose in principle” only.

### Conclusion

NATO enlargement as an action was a controversial and debated topic. However, the deciding reason for enlargement is an interesting question between a future prediction of instability, to which NATO enlargement was the answer, and one of NATO-aspiring states “forcing” NATO’s hand by very proactively pursuing membership.

As the analysis above highlights, the merits of both these theories for initial NATO enlargement exist in volumes; however, the rebuttals to the arguments are the deciding factor to their importance. The Power Vacuum theory stands taller than the Path to Membership Forcing Acceptance theory due to an undeniable characteristic – historical example. The precursors to both World War One and Two included a relatively weak Central and Eastern Europe pinned between a stronger (and at least loosely aligned) Western Europe and Russia/USSR. Additionally, both pre-world war Central and Eastern Europe existed under unilateral, local security agreements. These conditions resurfacing in the post-cold war era, and the Germans, among others, drawing them forward as historical example was key to the enlargement of NATO.

Similarly, the analysis above shows that for the second round of NATO enlargement, the Pseudo-Partner in Global Affairs Theory stands taller than the “Freedom Agenda” without Strategic Consideration and/or Understanding Theory. The impetus for this conclusion is that

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<sup>58</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 95.

<sup>59</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 95.

<sup>60</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 96.

the former theory hinges on the fact that the US worked closely and agreed often with the Russian Federation when it came to matters of CT, using this improved relationship garnered from such cooperation to the US' advantage by spreading democracy and western style security vis-à-vis NATO's second round of enlargement. Whereas the latter theory hinges on the fact that the Bush administration pushed its ideological foreign policy abroad, only seeking cooperation with the Russian Federation where it deemed beneficial to the US, and countering the Federation's foreign policy when the two came into conflict. Further, the second theory suggests that effectively the US' policy was to treat its relationship with the Russian Federation, with the second largest nuclear arsenal in the world and vastly important geopolitical significance to NATO enlargement, as a pawn – to be used for benefit when necessary, but sacrificed when the larger strategic aim necessitated it.

It is far more likely that the US acted as it historically has with its foreign policy – find cooperation when partners can agree and support democratic values, especially when within what it deems as its sphere of influence. Hence, the enlargement of NATO, whether in 1999 or 2004, was conducted on the basis of cooperating with newly formed states which sought to solidify their security situations under the largest security alliance in the world while becoming more democratic and with the Russian Federation on the CT mission in Central Asia, while not sacrificing democratic values in other states, essentially creating proxies resembling the Cold War.



## Annex B - Why Did Vladimir Putin Come to Power?

On December 31<sup>st</sup>, 1999 the acting president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, became the elected president of the Russian Federation. While a seemingly small promotion from acting president to president, the course of President Putin's rise was nothing short of meteoric. Born in Leningrad to a father who was factory laborer and former NKVD veteran of WWII and a mother who worked unskilled labor, Vladimir Putin grew up in a "lavish" (by the standards of Soviet Russia at the time for a family of three) 12 foot by 15 foot flat on the fifth story of an apartment in central Leningrad.<sup>61</sup> He was a poor student who spent much of his time fighting and playing in the courtyard of the apartment building. "I was a hooligan"<sup>62</sup> Putin would later describe himself in his biography.

Regardless of his origins, it is historic fact that Vladimir Putin would find his way from an apartment in central Leningrad to the prime seat in the Kremlin. Two competing theories suggest how he managed his ascent. First, through a combination of KGB assignments and a FSB plan, the *KGB Plant / FSB Plot Theory* supposes that his rise was a calculated and crafted series of promotions undertaken to place him, an intelligent KGB officer, at the highest levels of government. While this may seem far-fetched, plenty of historic evidence suggests some startling truths within it. Vadim Bakatin, a former head of the KGB once said, "The KGB, as it existed, could not be termed a secret service. It was an organization formed to control and suppress everything and anything. It seemed to be created especially for organizing conspiracies and coups, and it possessed everything necessary to carry them out: its own specially trained armed forces, the capacity to track and control communications, its own people inside all essential organizations, a monopoly on information, and many other things."<sup>63</sup> Another theory which holds significant weight is the *Loyalty and Luck Theory*. Among many things Putin values, loyalty seems to be one of the highest. His history is fraught with examples of either him showing resolved loyalty, even in the face of illegal or immoral actions, to others or of others giving or repaying resolved loyalty to him. As the author Angus Roxburgh puts it, Putin moved from the Mayoral offices in St. Petersburg to the Kremlin bureaucracy in Moscow through "a combination of luck and acquaintances".<sup>64</sup>

This analysis will seek to flesh out these two theories, while tracing the significant stops in the historic narrative along Vladimir Putin's rise to power. For a more detailed analysis of Putin's ability to consolidate and centralize power after his election to the Presidency, please see Annex D. In this analysis, one theme surfaces regardless of the legitimacy of either theory. Vladimir Putin was a man driven from a young age to seek power.

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<sup>61</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 46-47.

<sup>62</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal'ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 18.

<sup>63</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 94.

<sup>64</sup> Roxburgh, Angus. *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print. Pg. 19.

*The KGB Plant / FSB Plot Theory*

Putin aspired to be a KGB officer, specifically a spy, from a very early age. His father had been a part of the NKVD “subversive troops” sent to disrupt the Germans from behind the front line and Putin had grown up on his father’s harrowing stories. In fourth grade, Putin signed up for German Language classes as an elective, despite being a poor student, an early sign of ambition to serve abroad.<sup>65</sup> He even kept a portrait, according to a childhood friend, of Yan Berzin on his desk at school. Berzin was an early Bolshevik, the father of Soviet military intelligence, and the creator of spy outposts in all European countries.<sup>66</sup> At sixteen, Putin visited the local KGB directorate in Leningrad seeking employment. After being told that the KGB recruits vice taking volunteers, Putin set out to attend Leningrad University where he would study Law, as advised by the KGB officer with whom he had spoken.<sup>67</sup> At the end of his time in university, the KGB approached Putin and offered him a position, which he accepted. Regarding his elation at being selected for his life-long ambition, Putin said “I didn’t tell him that I had dreamed of this moment since I was a schoolboy. I didn’t tell him, because I remembered my conversation with the KGB office long ago: ‘we don’t take people who come to us on their own initiative.’”<sup>68</sup>

Putin spent the first four and a half years as a KGB agent assigned to an intelligence unit in Leningrad, a rather unceremonious “backwaters” posting.<sup>69</sup> After biding his time, his first foreign assignment came with a posting to Dresden, Germany. Even though he was working for the so called “illegal intelligence-gathering unit”, where agents used assumed identities and falsified documents, the work was drab due to the location of Dresden.<sup>70</sup> Putin’s highest achievement during his time in Dresden was the network of connections he built of Colombian-born nationals to a Colombian-born US Army sergeant, who in the end provided the KGB with an unclassified manual in exchange for 800 marks.<sup>71</sup> The Putins were ordered back to Leningrad in 1990 on the eve of German unification, an event which Putin felt was disastrous to his state and his beliefs— “the land [he] had been sent here to guard would just be handed over to the enemy. Everything [he] had worked for was now in doubt; everything he believed was being mocked.”<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 53.

<sup>66</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 53.

<sup>67</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal’ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 23.

<sup>68</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal’ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 41.

<sup>69</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 61.

<sup>70</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 64.

<sup>71</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 66.

<sup>72</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 66.

Putin returned to Leningrad University, but would only remain for three months – he was about to begin a career as a bureaucrat. Multiple stories exist how Anatoly Sobchak, the mayor of St. Petersburg (which was the name Leningrad returned to after 1991), a former law professor at Leningrad University, and a pro-democracy advocate came to hire Vladimir Putin into the St. Petersburg government. According to Sobchak, he noticed Putin at university, remembered him from his days as a student, and courted him into working for the government.<sup>73</sup> In Putin's version, he met with Sobchak in his office, "told him everything" (assuming to include his current status within the KGB), and Sobchak decided to hire him.<sup>74</sup> This is the first article of proof supporting this theory. Anatoly Sobchak was the leader of the pro-democracy city of St. Petersburg, and he himself was a pro-democratic politician. The murkiness of the details which surrounds Putin's entrance into the city's administration casts doubt on its legitimacy. Surely, the KGB which Bakatin previously described would have a vested interest in having an officer within the ranks of such a counter-communist movement.

Putin quickly rose to the position of Deputy Mayor to Anatoly Sobchak. His duties were centered about two major functions. First, he controlled foreign trade and investment for the city and second, he controlled information flow into and out of the government administration. These functions were the hallmark duties of KGB officers in the "active reserve" during the Soviet era.<sup>75</sup> The active reserve was what KGB officers became once they "left" the KGB service. These officers were of the "nearly uncountable and possibly uncounted numbers of KGB officers planted throughout the civilian institutions of the USSR".<sup>76</sup> While executing their civilian duties, they held specific functions within their jobs of interest of the KGB and drew a salary from the organization as well.<sup>77</sup>

Following Anatoly Sobchak's failure to gain reelection, the Putin's moved to Moscow, where Vladimir took over as the Deputy Head of Presidential Property Management. Again, the details of which made it appear as another active reserve style posting – the position held little public responsibility but granted Putin a great deal of access to elements of the government.<sup>78</sup> Within two years, Putin would be the Director of the FSB.<sup>79</sup> Vladimir Putin was now running the successor organization to his beloved KGB which had likely provided him with multiple opportunities for advancement thus far in his life.

Then, on August 7<sup>th</sup> 1999, an Islamic terrorist leader Ibn al-Khattab and a Chechnyan warlord Shamil Basayev launched a 1500 person assault on Dagestan in the Caucasus region.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 95.

<sup>74</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal'ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 88.

<sup>75</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 136.

<sup>76</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 93.

<sup>77</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 54.

<sup>78</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 140.

<sup>79</sup> Roxburgh, Angus. *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print. Pg. 19.

<sup>80</sup> Roxburgh, Angus. *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print. Pg. 21.

They sought the establishment of a Caliphate in the region. In September of the same year, four bombings claimed the lives of 300 Russians in Moscow and Volgograd, in the northern Caucasus.<sup>81</sup> Naturally, the intelligence pointed to Chechen terrorists being responsible for these bombings, and gave Putin, now Prime Minister, all the cause necessary to use military force in the region.<sup>82</sup>

In an eerie twist of history, a fifth bombing was averted and the plotting terrorists captured. However, three points of confusion lend credibility to the bombings being manufactured by the FSB to justify the use of military force. First, the terrorist turned out to be FSB agents, acting undercover. The FSB claimed, after the identity of their agents was discovered, that their agents were conducting an “exercise” and that the bags of explosives were nothing more than sugar. The local FSB knew nothing and officially reported surprise by the announcement from Moscow.<sup>83</sup> Second, three days prior to the bombing in Volgograd, a member of the Duma announced to parliament that he had just received the report of the bombing in the Caucasus. On that day, a bombing had occurred in Moscow, not the Caucasus.<sup>84</sup> Finally, the sad fates of all who have investigated the bombings resembles a silencing campaign akin to Soviet KGB methods. Of the independent committee commissioned to investigate, two were murdered and the third was killed in a car accident. The committee’s lawyer was arrested under illegal arms possession charges.<sup>85</sup> The journalist Anna Politkovskaya was shot four times at point-blank range<sup>86</sup> and former KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned by radioactive polonium in 2006.<sup>87</sup> These dark details point to the validity of the FSB, an agency which Vladimir Putin himself directed until a month prior to the bombings, having an orchestrating role in the framing of the conflict.

Finally, Putin celebrated “Cheka Day” on December 20<sup>th</sup>, 1999 which honored the state’s first security service. He did so by restoring the picture of Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB when Putin joined, to the wall of the FSB building. Later, at a gala, he was quoted as saying “I want to report that a group of FSB operatives, sent to work undercover in the government, is successfully carrying out the first stage of its mission.”<sup>88</sup>

The evidence pointing to the KGB planting Vladimir Putin in highly convenient positions for not only the organization’s gain but also Putin’s is quite believable. At least twice it appears that Putin was given significant opportunities via positions of the active reserve, promoting a KGB plan to advance him early in his career. Additionally, the evidence of the FSB plotting to shape events within the Russian Federation to possibly include the rise of Putin is quite

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<sup>81</sup> Roxburgh, Angus. *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print. Pg. 21.

<sup>82</sup> Roxburgh, Angus. *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print. Pg. 21.

<sup>83</sup> Roxburgh, Angus. *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print. Pg. 22.

<sup>84</sup> Roxburgh, Angus. *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print. Pg. 22.

<sup>85</sup> Roxburgh, Angus. *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print. Pg. 22.

<sup>86</sup> Zheglov, Aleksandr, Alek Akhundov, Olga Allenova, and Sergei Mashkin. "JOURNALIST TRADES HER LIFE FOR HER PROFESSION." *The Current Digest of the Post - Soviet Press* 58.41 (2006): 1-3. Web.

<sup>87</sup> Watson, Richard. "Litvinenko: A Deadly Trail of Polonium." *BBC News*, BBC, 28 July 2015, [www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33678717](http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33678717).

<sup>88</sup> Roxburgh, Angus. *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print. Pg. 25.

believable. Putin himself was running the FSB by July 1998 and the conflict in Chechnya (which may have been shaped by FSB actions) assisted greatly in his rise to Prime Minister, and ultimately President. Granted, one could easily dismiss much of this as conspiracy theory, but one must recall Putin's unabashed belief in the KGB as a boy, and the words that Bakatin once said "[The KGB] seemed to be created especially for organizing conspiracies and coups".<sup>89</sup>

### *The Loyalty and Luck Theory*

From an early age, Vladimir Putin believed that loyalty should be a core character trait. His rise to the presidency is littered with examples of either times where Putin showed loyalty to others and times where others showed loyalty to him (or repaid loyalty once given to them). In his biography, Putin recalls his days in high school and with his Sambo (a Soviet combination of Judo and wrestling) club, Trud Athletic Club.<sup>90</sup> During his bid to get into Leningrad University, his coaches attempted to persuade him to instead focus on his Sambo, which would lead to acceptance into an institution designed around more military careers such as the Academy of Civil Aviation or even the Army.<sup>91</sup> When Putin refused, his heart set on KGB service, and therefore law studies, his coaches tried to coerce him. They claimed to have helped him get into university and asked that he repay the favor by switching to another Sambo club. Putin learned that this was a ruse, and stayed with the Trud Club, saying "all my friends were there, and my first coach. I said I would never join another club. I would play for the one I wanted."<sup>92</sup> Additionally, it is difficult to say that anyone can make a career of anything with success without a measure of luck. However, Vladimir Putin's career is often marked with strokes of meeting the right person or being noticed at the right time. His accounts of these events lead to a rather lucky set of breaks for Putin at some rather critical times in his career.

Putin's belief in loyalty undoubtedly manifested when he was young; however, the full resolve of its importance to him culminated at the end of his KGB posting in Dresden. In 1989, Germans stormed the Ministry of Security (MGB) building in Dresden, Putin recalled that the military contingent for the USSR stated "we cannot do anything without orders from Moscow. And Moscow is silent."<sup>93</sup> Putin explains this gave him the feeling that "the country no longer existed. That it had disappeared. It was clear that the Union was ailing. And it had a terminal disease without a cure – a paralysis of power."<sup>94</sup> This event, in Putin's eyes, was likely seen as

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<sup>89</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 94.

<sup>90</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal'ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 19.

<sup>91</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal'ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 22-23.

<sup>92</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal'ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 25.

<sup>93</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal'ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 79.

<sup>94</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal'ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 79.

betrayal of loyalty. Loyalty which had been dutifully maintained by the KGB within Dresden, and loyalty which was not reciprocated by the Union.

Putin's truest examples of loyalty came in the form of personal relationships. First, with his to Anatoly Sobchak. During the coup attempt by the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (GKChP SSSR) in August of 1991, Putin remained devotedly by the side of Sobchak.<sup>95</sup> In his personal account, they set out to visit the people, specifically the factories and plants, like the Kirov Factory.<sup>96</sup> However, a different form of Putin's loyalty is painted by Masha Gessen, "this is mostly a lie: many independent eyewitnesses describe Sobchak, and Putin with him, going into hiding in the bunker at the Kirov industrial plant."<sup>97</sup> Even more interestingly, Putin says that the coup was "destroying the country".<sup>98</sup> Which motivated him to send his second resignation letter to the KGB (his first, sent to avoid blackmail while Deputy Mayor was "blocked" almost a year earlier<sup>99</sup>). Showing his loyalty to Sobchak, Putin said "I was no longer a KGB officer. As soon as the coup began, I immediately decided whose side I was on. I knew for sure that I would never follow the coup-plotter's orders. I would never be on their side."<sup>100</sup>

Later, Putin received some return on his loyalty investment. During his time in Sobchak's administration, Putin oversaw a barter system for food to be delivered to St. Petersburg in exchange for oil, timber, metals, cotton, and other natural resources granted to it by the Russian state.<sup>101</sup> For the \$92 million in exports and \$34 million in commissions to the companies which were to execute the foreign trade on behalf of St. Petersburg, none of the imported food made it into St. Petersburg.<sup>102</sup> A councilwoman of St. Petersburg, Marina Salye, investigated and found that these numbers only accounted for roughly 10% of the authorized export which Moscow had granted Sobchak's administration. She supplied her report, citing the kickback scheme and all to the city council, who referred it to Sobchak's office, who promptly killed any action.<sup>103</sup> Still, Salye wrote Yeltsin's office with the same information, gaining the eye of the Chief Comptroller, whose report on the matter to Yeltsin was effectively ignored and

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<sup>95</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 116.

<sup>96</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal'ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 93.

<sup>97</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 116-117.

<sup>98</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal'ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 93.

<sup>99</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal'ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 91.

<sup>100</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal'ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 93.

<sup>101</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 121.

<sup>102</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 122.

<sup>103</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 123.

nothing ever came of any of it.<sup>104</sup> Putin was the point man during this time for roughly a billion dollar kickback scheme and when his actions were called into question, it appears that those whom Putin had been loyally making rich, loyally defended their executioner.

The final act of loyalty to Anatoly Sobchak came after he lost reelection and was living under constant threat of prosecution. When St. Petersburg prosecutors finally caught up with Anatoly Sobchak, he collapsed in the briefing room and was rushed to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with a heart attack. He was then transferred to the care of a close Putin-family friend, Yuri Shevchecenko, and over the November 7<sup>th</sup> holiday weekend, he was quietly smuggled out of the country to Paris, where he would undergo a surgery. However, the receiving hospital, when questioned by Russian correspondents, had no record of any such patient.<sup>105</sup> As his biography describes it, the entire event appeared to be a “special operation organized by a professional”. Putin’s remarks to this were; “What are you talking about? There was nothing special about it. The newspapers wrote that he was whisked out, without even going through customs. That’s not true, he passed through customs and passport control at the border. Everything was as it was supposed to be. They put stamps in his passport. They put him on the airplane. That was that.”<sup>106</sup> The facts lend themselves to a grateful and loyal Putin, now with the connections afforded him by his Moscow active reserve posting, providing safe haven to his former boss.

Putin’s loyalty obviously didn’t end with Anatoly Sobchak. During his time in the presidential administration, Putin found a group of allies to whom his loyalty would prove invaluable. Yeltsin’s inner circle was known as The Family – it was comprised of Tatianna Yeltsin (Boris’ daughter), Valentin Yumashev (Yeltsin’s former Chief of Staff and Tatianna’s future husband), Alexander Voloshin (Yeltsin’s Chief of Staff), and Boris Berezovsky (a business tycoon who owned 49% of and controlled ORT, the state television channel). The Family, from the 1996 reelection of Yeltsin had been impressed by Putin’s loyalty and planned to move him through the Prime Minister position into the presidency as Yeltsin’s successor.<sup>107</sup> As the Director of the FSB, Vladimir Putin stymied or squashed multiple criminal investigations into The Family and other high level Kremlin officials, including Pavel Borodin.<sup>108</sup> When asked by his biographers how he made his move from St. Petersburg to Moscow and who had made him the job offer, Putin replied “Borodin, as odd as it may seem. Chief of Staff Pavel Borodin brought me into the presidential administration.”<sup>109</sup> Again, Vladimir Putin was loyally protecting those who had loyally given him a chance or protected him earlier.

Putin’s loyalty repayments from The Family didn’t end with his tenure in the FSB. During the presidential election in December 1999, Vladimir Putin was a relatively unknown actor. He had been Prime Minister for only a few months and only really known for leading the

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<sup>104</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 124.

<sup>105</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 140-141.

<sup>106</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal’ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 117.

<sup>107</sup> Roxburgh, Angus. *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print. Pg. 19.

<sup>108</sup> Roxburgh, Angus. *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print. Pg. 19.

<sup>109</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal’ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 125.

actions against terrorism in Chechnya. He was facing off against Yevgeny Primakov, the former director of the SVR and a former Prime Minister to Boris Yeltsin. Primakov had joined with Yuri Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow to form a powerful new party championed by the ideal of anti-corruption in the Yeltsin administration.<sup>110</sup> The Family formed a new political party, Yedinstvo (“unity” in English) around Putin. The party had no historic roots, no independent philosophy, and practically no policy objectives, but it did have two things – unabashed support for Vladimir Putin and unabashed support from Berezovsky’s ORT television channel and newspaper outlets.<sup>111</sup> ORT ran a smear campaign against Primakov and Luzhkov, citing their old age, frailness, and Luzhkov’s alleged corruption, while glorifying Putin as a hero for his actions in Chechnya.<sup>112</sup> For this brazen support, President Vladimir Putin’s first act as president of the Russian Federation was to grant immunity to his predecessor – Boris Yeltsin.<sup>113</sup>

Regarding Vladimir Putin’s luck, the two prime examples come from Anatoly Sobchak and Pavel Borodin. Again, Sobchak brought Putin into the St. Petersburg government at a time when he was unsure of his future. Following his tour in Dresden, Putin said of his future “I wanted to write my doctoral dissertation, check out the university, and perhaps get a job there.”<sup>114</sup> He mentions that a friend of his, who had remained on the staff of the university after completing his doctorate, asked if Putin would be willing to go to work for Anatoly Sobchak.<sup>115</sup> Why Putin? Why not another, more accomplished doctoral candidate or bright graduating student? As Putin says himself, “back when I was a student, I didn’t have any personal connections to him.”<sup>116</sup>

When Putin made the leap from St. Petersburg to the presidential administration in Moscow, it was Pavel Borodin who initiated the action. This again appears to be a stroke of good luck for a forty-four year old former KGB officer. As discussed above, Putin phrased his response to who gave him the job offer in Moscow with an “as odd as it may seem” ending. Denoting that he was amazed by this turn as much as anyone. He continued in his biography saying, “Chief of Staff Pavel Borodin brought me into the presidential administration. I don’t know why. We had met several times. That was essentially the extent of our relationship.”<sup>117</sup> The track record from this meeting to the presidency of the Russian Federation would be a short three and a half year journey.

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<sup>110</sup> Roxburgh, Angus. *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print. Pg. 24.

<sup>111</sup> Roxburgh, Angus. *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print. Pg. 24.

<sup>112</sup> Roxburgh, Angus. *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print. Pg. 24.

<sup>113</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 153.

<sup>114</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal’ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 86-87.

<sup>115</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal’ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 88.

<sup>116</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal’ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 88.

<sup>117</sup> Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, Gevorkian, Nataliia, Timakova, Natal’ia, Kolesnikov, A. V., and Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-portrait by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000. Print. PublicAffairs Reports. Pg. 125.



## *Conclusions*

As the analysis shows, both the *KGB Plant / FSB Plot Theory* and the *Loyalty and Luck Theory* have significant data to prove their worth. Unfortunately, as with many historical events, it is difficult to say with certainty that either stands alone as either the correct theory or the better of two theories. The conclusion drawn here is that both theories have truth in reality and explain Vladimir Putin's ascent to the Presidency of the Russian Federation.

The *KGB Plant / FSB Plot Theory* has its greatest weight early in Putin's bureaucratic career. The fact that Putin was so quickly hired by Sobchak, his job description akin to KGB active reserve postings, his submission of two separate resignation letters almost a year apart from each other, his job description in the Presidential Property Management Office also akin to an active reserve posting, and his posting to the head of the state intelligence service without "any" intelligence work for over seven years and only the lowly rank of Lieutenant Colonel upon resignation all point to the fact that his career path was carefully coordinated by an entity which had "its own people inside all essential organizations"<sup>118</sup> as Bakatin once described the KGB. Albeit, it is more difficult to suppose that the same organization was still pulling strings and crafting Putin's career once he was moved into the Prime Minister's position. At that point it appears that Putin himself had taken over the control of the planting and plotting, as best illustrated by the bombings (possibly all covertly organized by the FSB) which legitimized the military action in Chechnya.

Loyalty and luck speak volumes in Putin's past. It's undeniable that his loyalty to Sobchak was both because of and in return for the protection Sobchak provided him in the natural resources kickback scheme. Putin's loyalty really took center stage in his rise during his time in the FSB, as Prime Minister, and once he had secured the presidency. The protection he provided to The Family and the efforts they made to ensure his presidency were truly faithful acts amongst a group of compatriots of power and control. Whether through a series of planted opportunities, or a long-term investment strategy in loyalty, Vladimir Putin truly made the most of each position he held. He seems to have fulfilled his early belief as he told his biographers, "A single intelligence officer could rule over the fates of thousands of people. At least, that's how I saw it."<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. pg. 94.

<sup>119</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. pg. 59.

### **Annex C - What was the United States and NATO Strategic Focus from 2000-2010?**

The first decade of the twentieth century was a rapidly evolving and dynamic time for the international security environment. It came in on the heels of the 1990s, where the west had reshaped their security focus from a Cold War, anti-USSR posture to a smaller-scale, regionally focused posture. In the 1990s, the US and NATO had carried out intra-European military operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as many NATO allies joined the coalition with the US to counter Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in the Middle East. Russia had spent the decade attempting recovery from their abandonment of Communism and adoption of capitalism, Boris Yeltsin had scaled back the Russian military's operations by 90% of their 1989 levels, choosing instead to focus on internal security.<sup>120</sup>

Without its founding principle threat of the USSR, NATO was left to find new purpose and reinvent itself. Having spent the 1990s doing so, NATO issued an update to their Strategic Concept, akin to the US' National Defense Strategy, in 1999 to forecast the period from 2000-2010. The US, too, was seeking to establish its new direction in the wake of the Cold War and during the 1990s began to explore the future of its military. Seeing a future where the US military would be relatively unrivaled, it appeared as reduction of operations to favor cost saving measures to the American tax payer were set to come.

However, after 9/11, the security situation of the west rapidly changed. The fight against global terrorism enacted a NATO article V declaration, and began the western militaries shift of focus. Amid the "long battle" against terrorism, the US and NATO watched as the Russian Federation began their invasion of Georgia in 2008. While not deemed a revisionist or territorial land-grab by Russia, and therefore not drawing an international line between opponents, it was Russian military force being used in a conventional, not counter-terrorism (CT) manner.

What would have been in the mind of the US and NATO leaders as they watched this decade unfold? Starting with thoughts of retrenchment and enjoying a peace dividend, quickly shifting to protracted, expeditionary, low-intensity conflict, and then seeing the military might of a resurgent Russian Federation used outside of the Federation's borders. What would be the driving strategic thought which captured all these different events and led the US and NATO through them? The strategy of the US and NATO is laid out in their strategic documents, which paint a picture of the evolving direction and challenges facing both. Therefore, this annex is more of a historic narrative than a comparative analysis; however, with a hypothesis. This narrative will seek to show that a theory of *Fight the Fight in Front of You* emerged as the overarching policy and that due the rapidly changing events, the strategy driving the US and NATO was having to evolve as fast as the circumstances around it.

#### *The Forecast of the New Millennium*

The new millennium brought new changes to the strategic focus of the US and NATO, some known and some yet to be known. In a 1999, scholars wrote about "averting the train wreck" in the new millennium. There point mostly rode on the disparity between the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 1997 and the Clinton Administration's defense spending budget proposal. The QDR of 1997 had multiple key components to it. First, it retained the Army's ten division structure, maintained the Navy's twelve carrier battle groups (now known as

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<sup>120</sup> Rosefielde, Steven, and Hedlund, Stefan. *Russia since 1980: Wrestling with Westernization*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge UP, 2009. Print. World since 1980. Pg. 127.

carrier strike groups), reduced the Air Force's size by approximately 27,000 active duty personnel, renewed the Marine Corps three Marine Expeditionary Force structure, and drew a total US military end strength at 1,360,000 active duty personnel, 835,000 reservists, and 640,000 civilian personnel.<sup>121</sup> Second, it focused on maintaining a "high priority" on the development of a National Missile Defense (NMD) program.<sup>122</sup> A program which would not be fully realizable until the US's departure from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002.<sup>123</sup> Finally, it makes note of the requirement to maintain the strategic forces at current levels and ensure uninterrupted modernization across the force.<sup>124</sup> Keeping in mind that the QDR is a report generated by the Department of Defense to highlight the requirements of the future and provide the administration the tools to make proper budgetary proposals. The Clinton Administration proposed a defense spending bill for FY 2002 of \$275,000,000,000 (\$275B), which would account for 2.8% of GDP, and a required active duty end strength of 1,370,000 personnel.<sup>125</sup>

The disparity here is in achieving the size and modernization required by the QDR while remaining within budget. Once the funding for the required 1.37M personnel was accounted for and other discretionary requirements removed, only enough money remains to properly modernize 44% of the QDR dictated force structure.<sup>126</sup> "Unless assigned equipment could continue to operate beyond its projected service life, in both physical and economic terms, the military services eventually would see their force levels fall by as much as 56 percent as military equipment reached the end of useful service life and would be retired."<sup>127</sup>

This was the "push versus pull", requirements versus funding debate going into the twenty-first century. This type of military reduction is common as a "peace dividend", or the return of funding from defense spending to other areas following the conclusion of conflict. Unfortunately, this peace dividend would be short lived, as the US was entering another period of conflict soon after the turn of the century.

NATO too at this time was seeking to refine itself through the publication of a new Strategic Concept in 1999. This new vision centered on four major points. First, NATO was seeking to restructure itself in a more expeditionary manner. The view was that NATO's challenges now likely resided outside of the borders of Europe and that "opposing forces are likely to be configured very differently from the massed armour of the defunct Warsaw Pact."<sup>128</sup> Moreover, most European NATO members' armed services were structured to fight on their own territory, or that of a neighboring ally. They had, and, in most cases, still have, very little

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<sup>121</sup> United States, Congress. *The Quadrennial Defense Review*. U.S. G.P.O.:--For Sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs., Congressional Sales Office, 1997. Web. Pg. vii.

<sup>122</sup> United States, Congress. *The Quadrennial Defense Review*. U.S. G.P.O.:--For Sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs., Congressional Sales Office, 1997. Web. Pg. viii.

<sup>123</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 92.

<sup>124</sup> United States, Congress. *The Quadrennial Defense Review*. U.S. G.P.O.:--For Sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs., Congressional Sales Office, 1997. Web. Pg. viii.

<sup>125</sup> Gouré, Daniel, and Ranney, Jeffrey M. *Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999. Print. Significant Issues Ser.; v. 21, No. 5. Pg. 112.

<sup>126</sup> Gouré, Daniel, and Ranney, Jeffrey M. *Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999. Print. Significant Issues Ser.; v. 21, No. 5. Pg. 112.

<sup>127</sup> Gouré, Daniel, and Ranney, Jeffrey M. *Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999. Print. Significant Issues Ser.; v. 21, No. 5. Pg. 112.

<sup>128</sup> "NATO's Strategic Concept: Cohesion and Dissent." *Strategic Comments* 5.1 (1999): 1-2. Web.

capacity to project power over long distances.”<sup>129</sup> NATO began to form structures like that of the US armed services, under the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) model, capable of undertaking more rapid, flexible, and longer-range operations.<sup>130</sup>

Second, NATO recognized terrorism as a significant problem, but was torn on its implications for the alliance. Many of the European states felt at the time they were not as affected by terrorism because, unlike the US, they didn’t maintain an alliance with Israel nor stationed nearly the same number, if any, troops in the Middle East. Additionally, most states felt that since they already maintained intelligence sharing arrangements with one another, they were in the correct posture for combatting this threat.<sup>131</sup>

Third, NATO felt as though it had a significant role to play in countering weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This theme, whether discussed as anti-WMD, counter-WMD, anti-WMD proliferation, would persist through the strategic documents of both NATO and the US through the entire decade. Obviously, the sheer terrible totality of the use of a WMD makes the strategic importance of the mission to control them a persistent one. Interestingly, NATO was conflicted as to how they would play a role in anti-WMD strategy. “Most European states have been less than enthusiastic than the US about the ‘containment’ of Iran. As for North Korea, this is regarded as a purely US and East Asia issue.”<sup>132</sup>

Forth and finally, NATO took a strategic stance on their role regarding the United Nations (UN). It was NATO’s belief that they were authorized to act in accordance with international law, without UN approval, on behalf of a state which had been attacked, exemplified by Kuwait in 1990. However, the concept of unilateral NATO action was not the *modus operandi* of choice for many NATO allies. “UN approval should be sought whenever possible,” despite their own admission that “on occasion, Russia and China’s vetoes on the UN Security Council will make it impossible to seek prior approval for essential NATO action.”<sup>133</sup>

This is where the US and NATO strategically stood on the eve of 9/11. “Most of the politicians and electorates do not feel under any strong security threat”<sup>134</sup> The feeling of security and revision of strategic policy pointed toward a decade of “peace dividends” and likely military draw downs.

### *After the Turn of the Century*

The 2001 QDR was published just nineteen days following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks on the US. Obviously, this meant that this document was developed to provide a strategy of the future where the US had not been attacked on its own soil, especially since the research for the document was completed by December of 2000. The QDR specifically listed eight features of future conflict that the US military must be prepared for. Regional conflict, regional competitor attacking at the homeland, Anti-access / Area denial (A2AD) tactics and systems, WMDs as part of A2AD tactics and systems, involvement in failed states, operations in urban and “chaotic”

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<sup>129</sup> “NATO’s Strategic Concept: Cohesion and Dissent.” *Strategic Comments* 5.1 (1999): 1-2. Web.

<sup>130</sup> “NATO’s Strategic Concept: Cohesion and Dissent.” *Strategic Comments* 5.1 (1999): 1-2. Web.

<sup>131</sup> “NATO’s Strategic Concept: Cohesion and Dissent.” *Strategic Comments* 5.1 (1999): 1-2. Web.

<sup>132</sup> “NATO’s Strategic Concept: Cohesion and Dissent.” *Strategic Comments* 5.1 (1999): 1-2. Web.

<sup>133</sup> “NATO’s Strategic Concept: Cohesion and Dissent.” *Strategic Comments* 5.1 (1999): 1-2. Web.

<sup>134</sup> “NATO’s Strategic Concept: Cohesion and Dissent.” *Strategic Comments* 5.1 (1999): 1-2. Web.

environments, continued diffusion of military technology, and high levels of information warfare.<sup>135</sup>

Additionally, the QDR focused on Russia and higher-end threats than terrorism. During an in depth analysis, the QDR refers to Russia as “the most demanding future threat” to the US. Due to its ability to sustain production of defense material, its already significant quantities of defense equipment, and its access to a large pool of trained personnel.<sup>136</sup> The QDR highlights this combining its first two features of future conflict into a single thought and the capability of Russia to challenge the US. The QDR admits that several powers, taking specific note of the Russian Federation, have the ability to shortly challenge the US as strong regional actors.<sup>137</sup> Although it seems to temper its analysis of Russia when discussing the temporal aspects of threats to the US. “There seems to be agreement among many that a dissatisfied state could eventually build intensely into a near-peer to the United States sometime after 2025.”<sup>138</sup> This is a document riddled with Cold War assumptions. The fact that it concludes the Russian Federation could quickly produce and manufacture itself into a strong regional competitor, but then dismisses this fact, shows that it is looking at the security situation in terms of bipolarity versus unipolarity. The concept that a state would have to build “intensely” to achieve near-peer status by 2025 assumes a state attempting to rival the US’ global reach and underplays the strategic advantage of a rival focusing their build-up in a single region.

The 2001 National Security Strategy (NSS), also produced before the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, highlight’s the Russian Federations challenge to US interests and the international community as well. While discussing the incidence in Chechnya (please see Annex B for a more detailed account of Chechnya in the early 2000s), it says, “Chechnya is a major problem in Russia’s post-Communist development and relationship with the international community; the means Russia is using in Chechnya are undermining its legitimate objective of upholding its territorial integrity and protecting citizens from terrorism and lawlessness.”<sup>139</sup> As well, the NSS states the importance of the Russian Federation to the international community. As the newly independent states (NIS) formed after the fall of the Soviet Union, they sought to find their way in the international system and the NSS points out that even as of 2000, their efforts depend on the “largest and most power – Russia.”<sup>140</sup>

After this point, the strategic documents published by the US and NATO had almost a singular theme – combatting terrorism. Many security issues of the first few years of the century and of the last century persisted through the time of the GWOT; however, the shift in strategic mentality that the current “enemy” or the “fight in front of us” was global terrorism.

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<sup>135</sup> Flournoy, Michèle A. *QDR 2001: Strategy-driven Choices for America's Security*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense UP, 2001. Print. Pg. 56.

<sup>136</sup> Flournoy, Michèle A. *QDR 2001: Strategy-driven Choices for America's Security*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense UP, 2001. Print Pg. 32.

<sup>137</sup> Flournoy, Michèle A. *QDR 2001: Strategy-driven Choices for America's Security*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense UP, 2001. Print Pg. 30.

<sup>138</sup> Flournoy, Michèle A. *QDR 2001: Strategy-driven Choices for America's Security*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense UP, 2001. Print Pg. 50.

<sup>139</sup> “National Security Strategy 2001.” *National Security Strategy Archive*, 25 May 2012, nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2000/. Pg. 57.

<sup>140</sup> “National Security Strategy 2001.” *National Security Strategy Archive*, 25 May 2012, nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2000/. Pg. 60.

*Post 9/11*

The events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 vaulted the US and NATO, under an article V declaration, into the GWOT. Specifically, the US and NATO targeted the terrorist network al Qaeda, and its safe haven of Afghanistan, to eradicate the threat posed by this extremist group. The military operations in Afghanistan forced the US and NATO to rethink their tactics and strategy. There was not a conventional force opposing the NATO regular forces, and the fighting created space for rapid innovation in the NATO strategy regarding asymmetric warfare, urban conflict, and counter insurgency operations.

The Bush administration published its 2002 NSS following the attacks, and much of it is focused specifically at defeating terrorism and defending the homeland. Notably, the first two points of intent in the President's introduction are to "champion aspirations for human dignity" and to "strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends".<sup>141</sup> The former is a guiding headline under which oppressive regimes, such as the Taliban, were targeted during the GWOT. The latter is a clear reference to NATO and the functions the US was happy it was supplying in the GWOT. In the section discussing human dignity, the Strategy says, "No people on earth yearn to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police."<sup>142</sup> The section goes even further, citing that the US will "press governments" and "take special efforts" regarding democratic development and promotion of freedom.<sup>143</sup> These words show that the resolve against anti-democratic states was of the highest priority for the Bush administration in 2002 and that the administration vaguely framed their response so as not to remove any possible courses of action.

The discussion of defeating global terrorism is more direct and explicit. "The enemy is terrorism – premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents."<sup>144</sup> It expands the details of this enemy and the fight which will meet it saying, "the struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of successes – some seen, some unseen."<sup>145</sup> The US laid out in this strategy an expectation for the military road ahead. The fight will be global therefore not just in Afghanistan, the fight will be protracted and last for some time, and the fight will be sometimes secretive and may not lend itself to public viewership.

The NSS did mention the Russian Federation, a state which was rapidly centralizing power and shifting away from democracy under Putin's leadership at this time. "Russia is in the midst of a hopeful transition, reaching for its democratic future and a partner in the war on terror."<sup>146</sup> Additionally, it says that we have "moved from confrontation to cooperation as the

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<sup>141</sup> "National Security Strategy 2002." *National Security Strategy Archive*, 25 May 2012, [nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/](http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/). Pg. 1.

<sup>142</sup> "National Security Strategy 2002." *National Security Strategy Archive*, 25 May 2012, [nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/](http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/). Pg. 3.

<sup>143</sup> "National Security Strategy 2002." *National Security Strategy Archive*, 25 May 2012, [nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/](http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/). Pg. 4.

<sup>144</sup> "National Security Strategy 2002." *National Security Strategy Archive*, 25 May 2012, [nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/](http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/). Pg. 5.

<sup>145</sup> "National Security Strategy 2002." *National Security Strategy Archive*, 25 May 2012, [nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/](http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/). Pg. 5.

<sup>146</sup> "National Security Strategy 2002." *National Security Strategy Archive*, 25 May 2012, [nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/](http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/). Introductory Letter from the President.

hallmark of our relationship with Russia”<sup>147</sup>, and that “the United States and Russia are no longer strategic adversaries.”<sup>148</sup> The NSS paints a picture of two states who are quickly becoming allies, through the common enemy of terrorism. This rhetoric supports the idea of *fighting the fight in front of you*, regardless of what the internal situation was within the Russian Federation, at this time they were assisting in the most pressing issue for the US, the GWOT. In a short and intriguing paragraph, the NSS does recognize the still pending challenges to the US-Russian relationship. “Lingering distrust of our motives and policies by key Russian elites slows improvement in our relations. Russia’s uneven commitment to the basic values of free-market democracy and dubious record in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remain matters of great concern.”<sup>149</sup>

While not necessarily a strategic document, President Bush’s address to the graduating class of 2002 from the United States Military Academy in West Point, NY serves as a strategic communication regarding the changing security environment and the US’ future intentions. The president made a few key points pertaining to the GWOT which likely had different interpretations in Moscow. President Bush discussed how containment and deterrence, the hallmark strategies of the previous seventy years (and obviously opposition tactics to the Soviet Union and Communism), no longer held applicability in a world of terrorism.<sup>150</sup> Granted, most security scholars would agree with this, whether based in Washington or Moscow; however, the president quickly followed with, “We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systematically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.”<sup>151</sup> The concept that “tyrants who break non-proliferation treaties” are not to have the faith of the US was likely pointed in the direction of North Korea and Iran, two states President Bush would brand as part of the “Axis of Evil”; however, in Russia one could not help but see the similarity to the President’s NSS. Russia has a “dubious record” in preventing WMD proliferation according to the NSS, and the President stated that he has no faith in the “tyrants” who act as such. Likely, Putin inferred that he was one of these tyrants.

Secondly, President Bush said that “if we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.”<sup>152</sup> Again, a statement which while highly debatable among security scholars, had its place in the security strategy of the Bush administration regarding terrorism and the GWOT. However, the view from Moscow could have been completely different. It is easy to see that this statement, paired so closely to the discussion of “tyrants” may have included the Russian Federation as a possible target of US preemptive force.

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<sup>147</sup> “National Security Strategy 2002.” *National Security Strategy Archive*, 25 May 2012, [nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/](http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/). Pg. 13

<sup>148</sup> “National Security Strategy 2002.” *National Security Strategy Archive*, 25 May 2012, [nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/](http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/). Pg. 26

<sup>149</sup> “National Security Strategy 2002.” *National Security Strategy Archive*, 25 May 2012, [nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/](http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/). Pg. 27.

<sup>150</sup> “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point.” *National Archives and Records Administration*, National Archives and Records Administration, 1 June 2002, [georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html](http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html).

<sup>151</sup> “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point.” *National Archives and Records Administration*, National Archives and Records Administration, 1 June 2002, [georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html](http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html).

<sup>152</sup> “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point.” *National Archives and Records Administration*, National Archives and Records Administration, 1 June 2002, [georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html](http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html).

NATO at the same time was looking to update its strategy and create the foundations of an alliance which possessed the necessary capabilities to fight global terror. In 2002, NATO issued the Prague Communiqué, creating two institutions with that specific aim. First, it established the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (NATO SACT) to create strategy and doctrine without the burden of simultaneous operational responsibilities of NATO forces. According to NATO, the four principle functions of SACT are strategic thinking, development of capabilities, education, training, and exercises, and cooperation and engagement.<sup>153</sup> Second, NATO introduced the Rapid Response Force (RRF). The design behind this force is that NATO will have a standing, ready force to react rather than NATO being forced to draw together, train, and deploy a multinational force after crisis has occurred. NATO's purpose for the RRF is to be "able to provide a rapid military response to an emerging crisis, whether for collective defence purposes or for other crisis-response operations. The [RRF] gives the Alliance the means to respond swiftly to various types of crises anywhere in the world. It is also a driving engine for NATO's military transformation."<sup>154</sup>

### *The Intra-GWOT Period*

From 2003-2010, the US and NATO were engrossed in military conflict in the Middle East and with the eradication of global terrorism that threatened the west. Notably, during this same time the Russian Federation was completing its power consolidation, began making its warnings to the west that it may feel inclined to use said power, and even executed military operations in its neighbor Georgia. For a more detailed analysis of the Russian Federation's 2000-2010 history, please see Annex D.

Numerous strategic documents were produced in this period including the 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS), 2004 NATO Istanbul Communiqué, 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS), 2006 QDR, 2006 NSS, and the 2006 NATO Riga Communiqué. Unsurprisingly, all these documents outlined a very clear strategic focus of the US and NATO – global terrorism. The interesting analysis of these documents shows what is not discussed as a part of the US and NATO's strategic focus. Some documents, such as the 2004 NMS and the NATO Istanbul Communiqué had no direct references to the Russian Federation while others reference the Russian Federation with regard to CT or anti-WMD proliferation. Along the historic trail from 2003-2010, some increasing thoughts on the changes occurring within the Federation and on the Federation's actions in Georgia began to emerge.

The 2006 QDR states that "Russia remains a country in transition. It is unlikely to pose a military threat to the United States or its allies on the same scale or intensity as the Soviet Union during the Cold War."<sup>155</sup> Like the 2001 QDR before it, this statement is down-playing the regional threat posed by the Russian military build-up and glossing it over by pointing out that the Russian Federation will not return to the global reach of capabilities that the Soviet Union had. Following the presidential election in Ukraine (for a more detailed account please see Annex D), the 2005 NSS had slightly stronger words for the Russian Federation. "Recent trends regrettably point toward a diminishing commitment to democratic freedoms and institutions. We will work to try to persuade the Russian Government to move forward, not backward, along

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<sup>153</sup> Nato. "Allied Command Transformation (ACT)." *NATO*, [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_52092.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52092.htm).

<sup>154</sup> Nato. "NATO Response Force (NRF)." *NATO*, [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49755.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm).

<sup>155</sup> Office of The Secretary Of Defense Washington DC. "Quadrennial Defense Review Report." (2006). Web. Pg. 29.



freedom's path.”<sup>156</sup> Further, the NSS alludes to the suspected election tampering in Ukraine by the Russian government, “efforts to prevent democratic developments at home and abroad will hamper the development of Russia's relations with the United States, Europe, and its neighbors.”<sup>157</sup>

It was at this time that the Russian Federation began issuing warnings to the west about what it considered its sphere of influence. First, to the combined Federal Assembly in 2006 and then to the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007, Putin outlined that the Russian Federation did not believe in the world as a unipolar system, and especially not in an international order where the legitimacy of the UN could be substituted by the EU or NATO.<sup>158</sup> Then, after eight years of consolidating power in Russia, Putin launched the 2008 war in Georgia. Assumingly, the US and NATO would take notice of this action and recognize the regional power and threat that the now centralized Russian Federation was. However, the 2010 QDR focuses (again) mostly on CT, the securing of cyberspace, and the non-proliferation of WMDs as its themes.<sup>159</sup> Only the 2010 NSS takes a stab at identifying the Russian Federation as a revisionist power and threat to European security. “We seek to build a stable, substantive, multidimensional relationship with Russia, based on mutual interests. The United States has an interest in a strong, peaceful, and prosperous Russia that respects international norms. As the two nations possessing the majority of the world's nuclear weapons, we are working together to advance nonproliferation, both by reducing our nuclear arsenals and by cooperating to ensure that other countries meet their international commitments to reducing the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. We will seek greater partnership with Russia in confronting violent extremism, especially in Afghanistan. We also will seek new trade and investment arrangements for increasing the prosperity of our peoples. We support efforts within Russia to promote the rule of law, accountable government, and universal values. While actively seeking Russia's cooperation to act as a responsible partner in Europe and Asia, we will support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia's neighbors.”<sup>160</sup> This is the entirety of the statement given to Russia as a “21<sup>st</sup> century center of influence”. As is common throughout the 2000-2010 period, it opens on the control of WMDs and recognizes that Russia's substantial strategic weapons cache makes it a critical partner in this venture. Then, again the common theme through the “intra-GWOT” period, it discusses the common interest of CT operations. Finally, it closes with a statement – “we will support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia's neighbors”.<sup>161</sup> Not a threat or a strong assurance to said neighbors, but finally, after ten years of centralization of power and increasing threat to Europe, the US recognizes that Russia may actually be an actor which can destabilize Europe.

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<sup>156</sup> “National Security Strategy 2006.” *National Security Strategy Archive*, 25 May 2012, [nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2006/](http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2006/). Pg. 39.

<sup>157</sup> “National Security Strategy 2006.” *National Security Strategy Archive*, 25 May 2012, [nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2006/](http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2006/). Pg. 39.

<sup>158</sup> “Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy.” *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 12 Feb. 2007, [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on).

<sup>159</sup> United States, Congress. *The Quadrennial Defense Review*. U.S. G.P.O.:--For Sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs., Congressional Sales Office, 2010. Web.

<sup>160</sup> “National Security Strategy 2010.” *National Security Strategy Archive*, 6 June 2012, [nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2010/](http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2010/). Pg. 44.

<sup>161</sup> “National Security Strategy 2010.” *National Security Strategy Archive*, 6 June 2012, [nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2010/](http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2010/). Pg. 44.

## *Conclusion*

From 2000-2010, the US and NATO saw a changing security environment, one marred with asymmetric threats and unprecedented challenges. Global terrorism struck the very heart of the west early in the decade and occupied its focus for the remainder. Undoubtedly, the efforts to rid the world of terrorism and the safe havens which sponsor or harbor terrorists was not just noble, but a necessary action for world security. However, this time proved that crises and reactionary tactics rarely fit within the structures of calculated strategies.

From the beginning of the century, the US and NATO were focused on scaling back their militaries, either in size or by operations, in order to reap the rewards of a stable peace. At this time, the US noted that the Russian Federation was its “most demanding future threat”<sup>162</sup>, yet it would quickly back from that position following 9/11 despite the increasing authoritarianism and resurging military within the Federation. However, with that peace shattered, the restructuring of forces capable to combat a terrorist threat and strategizing of how to employ those forces to combat said threat became the principle work in the west.

The Russian Federation, with its own history of combatting terrorism in the Caucasus, found common ground with the west in its conflict with global terrorism. However, during this time the Russian Federation continued to centralize and reconstitute its armed forces. As the west created new strategies for countering terrorism, they took steps, including unilateral actions, which they felt were in the best interests of winning the fight against global terrorism. The Russian Federation disagreed and a Thucydides Trap between the east and west was born. President Putin, while supporting the flow of US military equipment into Afghanistan in 2007, said that unilateralism “stimulates an arms race.”<sup>163</sup>

From the strategic documents of the United States and NATO, the overarching strategy from 2000-2010 was to fight the fight in front of them, which of course was terrorism. Unfortunately, this meant making compromises in other areas, such as in the west’s evaluation of Vladimir Putin’s consolidation of power in the Russian Federation, and the actions the Russian Federation proved it was willing to take inside its perceived sphere of influence. The first decade of the twenty-first century showed that a strategic focus on terrorism, while appeasing the deterioration of democracy and buildup of conventional power in the Russian Federation, lead to another rapid shift in strategy – one that would recognize the return of great power competition.

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<sup>162</sup> Flournoy, Michèle A. *QDR 2001: Strategy-driven Choices for America's Security*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense UP, 2001. Print Pg. 32.

<sup>163</sup> “Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy.” *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 12 Feb. 2007, [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on).

## **Annex D - Why is Putin Able to Wield Such Significant Power?**

The Russian Federation under Boris Yeltsin saw corruption, violence, and even the president-loyal army shell the house of the Russian parliament. Yeltsin's tenure did show that he wielded significant power within the Federation; however, it also showed that Yeltsin lacked either enough political power or influence to prevent their occurrence in the first place. Interestingly, Vladimir Putin has not had to deal with the same level of infighting and turmoil as his predecessor. How has Putin managed to achieve this? What power, influence, or control does Putin wield which Yeltsin did not? Normally, a historical analysis would suggest two to three theories and seek to explore which is the most logically correct reason for an event's or circumstance's occurrence. However, regarding Vladimir Putin's ability to wield dramatic power and near complete state control as the president of the Russian Federation is more of a historic narrative than analysis. He has accomplished his consolidation and build-up of power relatively in the open, through legislative means and domestic and foreign policies.

Along the narrative, an important turning point seems to arise. At this point, Vladimir Putin shifts his efforts from consolidation of power to the projection of that power. This shift occurs between 2004 and 2005, after the Ukrainian presidential election. As such, this narrative is broken into two parts – 2000-2004 and 2005-2008.

### *The Consolidation of Power in Putin's First Term*

As discussed in Annex B, Putin's first act as president was to grant immunity to his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin,<sup>164</sup> and the day following his party's (Yedinstvo) victory in the Duma elections, Putin was quoted as saying "I want to report that a group of FSB operatives, sent to work undercover in the government, is successfully carrying out the first stage of its mission."<sup>165</sup> Making good on his illusion to an FSB plot to assume control of the government, Putin's next actions were the beginning of his consolidation of power.

In the first two months of his presidency, Vladimir Putin issued eleven decrees. Six of them were military in nature and within a month of assuming the presidency, Putin's Prime Minister announced that defense spending would be increased by 50%.<sup>166</sup> Three of the most noteworthy decrees were the removal of limitations and restoration of Soviet Era practices. First, he removed the "no-first-strike" policy from the use of nuclear weapons in the military doctrine.<sup>167</sup> As startling as that may seem, it was likely issued so early on in his presidency in order to give the new and still relatively unknown bureaucrat more strength in foreign policy negotiations, especially regarding the US. This would make sense given that the Russian president will not meet face to face with the US president to begin a personal relationship until

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<sup>164</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 153.

<sup>165</sup> Roxburgh, Angus. *The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print. Pg. 25.

<sup>166</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 154.

<sup>167</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 153.

June 2001.<sup>168</sup> Second, Putin restored the mandatory training exercises for the military reserves. The startling circumstance here is the within the Russian Federation, all able-bodied men are considered part of the reserves. This practice was abandoned sometime in the late 1980s after the conclusion of the USSR's operations in Afghanistan.<sup>169</sup> Finally, the president decreed that military training, such as small arms use and maintenance, was to be reinstituted in public and private secondary schools. This policy too was from the bygone Soviet era, abolished during Perestroika under Mikhail Gorbachev.<sup>170</sup> Finally, while not a military decree, but power-consolidating nonetheless, Putin authorized some forty-odd ministers and other government officials to classify documents as state secrets<sup>171</sup>, a direct violation of article 29 of the Russian Federation constitution, which states, "everyone shall have the right freely to seek, receive, transmit, produce, and disseminate information by any legal means. The list of types of information, which constitute State secrets, shall be determine by federal law."<sup>172</sup> Putin, from early in his presidency, felt as though his decree was evidently as powerful as a majority vote in the Duma and Federal Council, the prescribed method by which federal law is passed in the Russian Federation.

President Putin then set out on a mission to centralize his control on the valuable large business resources of Russia, including media and the oil and gas industry. Gazprom serves as the prime example of Putin's move to centralize these industries. During the 1990's and early 2000's, Rem Vyakhirev and his family ran Gazprom and its subsidiaries as personal wealth generators.<sup>173</sup> If left unchecked, the Vyakhirev family would have likely privatized the entire organization in an effort to fully realize the personal profit. Seeing this massive business and its profits as a possible revenue source for political opposition in the future, Putin moved against Vyakhirev in May 2001. After a single meeting at the Kremlin, Alexey Miller was appointed as the new CEO of Gazprom. Miller had been Putin's subordinate in St. Petersburg in the Committee on International Relations – the organization through which Putin executed the natural resource kickback scheme as described in Annex B.<sup>174</sup> Alexey Miller would go on the sanitize much of Gazprom's leadership loyal to Vyakhirev and ensure the state, specifically Putin, would remain unchallenged by this corporation's wealth.<sup>175</sup>

However, natural resource industry was not the only target of Putin's consolidation. Prior to Gazprom, Putin had Vladimir Gusinsky, a powerful media magnate, arrested and his NTV television channel sold and effectively turned over to the government.<sup>176</sup> To achieve this, the Kremlin forced the Gusinsky to trade his stake in the company for his personal freedom. "Someone [...] had leaked to the press a document Gusinsky had signed before leaving the

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<sup>168</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 91.

<sup>169</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 154.

<sup>170</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 154.

<sup>171</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 154.

<sup>172</sup> "THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION." THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION - Fundamental Documents, [www.mid.ru/en/foreign\\_policy/official\\_documents/-/asset\\_publisher/CptlCk6BZ29/content/id/571508](http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCk6BZ29/content/id/571508).

<sup>173</sup> Miller, Chris. *Putinomics: Power and Money in Resurgent Russia*. 2018. Print. Pg. 48.

<sup>174</sup> Miller, Chris. *Putinomics: Power and Money in Resurgent Russia*. 2018. Print. Pg. 49.

<sup>175</sup> Miller, Chris. *Putinomics: Power and Money in Resurgent Russia*. 2018. Print. Pg. 49.

<sup>176</sup> Miller, Chris. *Putinomics: Power and Money in Resurgent Russia*. 2018. Print. Pg. 35.

country. [...] this was a classic organized-crime contract, formalizing the exchange of one's business for one's personal safety, and the state was party to it."<sup>177</sup> Most shockingly, Boris Berezovsky, the man who through the efforts of his ORT television channel had help ensure Putin's rise to the presidency, was driven by these acts to remain outside Russia in exile.<sup>178</sup> Consolidation of these industries gave the Kremlin, and obviously Putin, unparalleled (in the Russian Federation's history, but not necessarily the USSR's) control over highly lucrative international trade and domestic information flows. Referring to Annex B, recall that these two functions (foreign trade and information flow) were often the two associated with the KGB active reserve positions Putin held earlier in his career.

President Putin then set out to consolidate his political power within government. Commonly referred to as "strengthening vertical power", this was Putin creating a system which eerily resembled the KGB Vadim Bakatin once described as "an organization formed to control and suppress everything and anything. [...] its own people inside all essential organizations, a monopoly on information, and many other things."<sup>179</sup> First, Putin abolished the elected status of the Federal Council in lieu of political appointees. Each of Russia's eighty-nine regions would have two appointed members, one by the governor and the other by the region's legislature.<sup>180</sup> This could be seen as actually decentralizing power among the regions of the Federation; however, the second and third acts of "strengthening vertical power" crushed that thought immediately. Putin placed two very powerful controls on each of the eighty-nine regions of the Federation. First, he passed a bill authorizing the removal of a governor from his or her posting for the mere suspicion of wrongdoing, and without legal due process or a court ruling. Next, the Kremlin directed that presidentially appointed envoys will be sent to oversee each of the seven large territories (each comprising about a dozen regions) to oversee the work of the regional governors.<sup>181</sup> The pedigree of these appointed envoys was disturbing to democratic principles. "Only two of them were civilians and one of these very much appeared to have the biography of an undercover KGB agent. Two were KGB officers from Leningrad, one was a police general, and two more were army generals who had commanded the troops in Chechnya."<sup>182</sup>

It was around this time that Putin received one of his first lasting lessons on the importance of a well-funded and ready military. On August 12<sup>th</sup>, 2000, the Russian Northern Fleet was ordered to carry out an "assembly march", essentially an underway exercise but by the nature of not being called such, had no requirements in law or regulation.<sup>183</sup> One of the crew of the nuclear-powered "Oscar Class" submarine *Kursk*, assigned to the Northern Fleet, told his mother, six days before disaster, that "death is on board with us" – referring to the poor state of

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<sup>177</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 163.

<sup>178</sup> Miller, Chris. *Putinomies: Power and Money in Resurgent Russia*. 2018. Print. Pg. 35.

<sup>179</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 94.

<sup>180</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 181.

<sup>181</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 181.

<sup>182</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 181-182.

<sup>183</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 165.

repair the *Kursk* and her onboard ordnance.<sup>184</sup> Presumably a torpedo explosion, some catastrophic accident sent *Kursk* to the bottom of the Barents Sea.<sup>185</sup> The Russian Navy was unable to mount a successfully rescue operation and on the eighth day following the accident, the Russian government accepted Norwegian assistance. After managing to dock with the bottomed submarine, the rescue crew found no survivors.<sup>186</sup> Putin, returning from a vacation on the Black Sea, met with the families of the Sailors onboard *Kursk*. According to his biographer, he spent two hours and forty minutes with them outlining the compensation packages and answering heated questions.<sup>187</sup> When asked about the foreign diver assistance, why it took so long to accept the help, and whether Russia had these types of rescue divers organic to her fleet, Putin was recorded as furiously shouting “We don’t have crap in this country!”<sup>188</sup> This event no doubt set in the president’s mind, though he had already promised to restore the military, a resolve to do so which previously may not have been present.

By the end of 2001, President Putin had now centralized major Russian business, including major energy exporters and media outlets, placed his own people over the regional governors, begun the efforts to restore the military might of Russia, and replaced an elected legislative body with appointees from the very regions of which he now had “envoy-control”. The Duma, the lower house of Russian Parliament, was the last remaining holdout of his “vertical power”. Putin didn’t have to wait long to find a reason to implement measures of control on this entity.

In September of 2004, 300 armed men seized control of a school in Beslan, North Ossetia. After a three-day standoff with Federal Officers, the government forces stormed the building. In the resulting aftermath, over three hundred people, including children at the school, lay dead.<sup>189</sup> Putin addressed his mourning nation with these words, “we have to act, we have to increase the effectiveness of the government in combating the entire complex of problems facing the country... I am convinced that the unity of the country is the main condition of success in the fight against terrorism.”<sup>190</sup> The “entire complex of problems facing the country” clear states that ending terrorism is not the only goal of any actions President Putin is about to undertake.

True to his vague words, President Putin instituted four new laws to control the political power of the Russian Federation. First, governors and the mayor of Moscow would no longer be elected officials; instead they would be presidential appointees. Second, he increased the scrutiny of the registration process by which political parties registered to be considered on ballots. Additionally to re-registering, the required threshold of votes required to gain seats in parliament would be raised from 5% to 7%. Third, Putin instituted a system of “proportional representation” in the Duma. From now on, Russian citizens would vote for their desired

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<sup>184</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 166.

<sup>185</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 166.

<sup>186</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 167.

<sup>187</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 170-171.

<sup>188</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 171.

<sup>189</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 189.

<sup>190</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 190.

political party, not for a candidate to the Duma. Once the total percentage of votes was calculated, and assuming the party received more than the required 7%, the party would name the representatives who would be filling their allotted percentage of seats in the Duma. Finally, Putin created a new body, the Public Chamber (made up of presidential appointees), to review proposed legislation before it went to the Duma.<sup>191</sup>

Putin had now succeeded in almost every facet of power consolidation in Russia. By the nature of the presidency before his time in office, he had control of the Russian armed forces. He had assumed control of the largest businesses in Russia to include the highly lucrative natural resource exportation industry and the media outlets. He had replaced the Federal Council with appointees from the regional governors; governors whom he now personally appointed. He had made the development of political party rivals even more difficult. He had removed the candidates from the Duma elections, therefore enforcing a party-affiliation as the defining characteristic of voting behavior. Finally, he had seized control of the end-to-end legislative process by creating the Public Chamber (again, presidentially appointed) to review laws before they went before the Duma and by extension the Federal Council. He had the military, the laws, the money, and the information – and soon he may find reason to use them.

#### *The Ukrainian Presidential Election of 2004*

In Annex A, under **Part II – 2004 Enlargement**, the “Freedom Agenda” without *Strategic Consideration and/or Understanding Theory*, the Ukrainian presidential election of 2004 is briefly described. It was widely held that the Russian Federation was tempering in the Ukrainian presidential election in favor of the Russian-leaning candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, including a possible poisoning attempt on the US-leaning candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. From the Russian prospective, it is believed that the US interfered in the election on behalf of Yushchenko, eventually allowing his victory in a run-off.<sup>192</sup> “From Peter the Great to Stalin, Russia has always been an empire.”<sup>193</sup> This concept, not novel to the citizenry of the Russian Federation, is the basis upon which the Russian “sphere of influence” ideology is based. Ukraine has been historically linked to Russia as a state within this sphere of influence and during the USSR period, one of the largest and most important SSRs in the Union. “Ukraine has been a part of the Soviet Union or Russian Empire, unofficially, since the 1700s.”<sup>194</sup> Even today, Ukraine is a uniquely strategic key among European countries in terms of Russian partnerships. “The second-largest European country, with a population of over forty-five million, Ukraine is a valuable strategic prize positioned astride the major transit corridor for Russian oil and gas into Europe.”<sup>195</sup> Regardless of the merit of US interference in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, the Russian Federation and Putin must have felt that the victory of the US-leaning candidate marked the slipping of Ukraine out from the Russian sphere. Much later in 2014,

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<sup>191</sup> Gessen, Masha. *The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. First Riverhead Trade Paperback ed. 2013. Print. Pg. 190.

<sup>192</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 95.

<sup>193</sup> Jordan, Amos A, Taylor, William J., and Mazarr, Michael J. *American National Security*. 5th ed. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins UP, 1999. Print. Pg. 357.

<sup>194</sup> Schoen, Douglas E., and Smith, Evan Roth. *Putin's Master Plan: To Destroy Europe, Divide NATO, and Restore Russian Power and Global Influence*. First American ed. 2016. Print. Pg. 14.

<sup>195</sup> Schoen, Douglas E., and Smith, Evan Roth. *Putin's Master Plan: To Destroy Europe, Divide NATO, and Restore Russian Power and Global Influence*. First American ed. 2016. Print. Pg. 14.

Putin would drop all guises of rhetoric and refer to Ukraine as “Novorossiia” (“New Russia”, in English) and say “Kharkiv, Lugansk, Donetsk, Odessa we not part of Ukraine in Tsarist times, they were transferred in 1920. Why? God knows.”<sup>196</sup>

The year following Yushchenko’s victory for the presidency of Ukraine, NATO began discussions of extending a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine. “From 2005, Russian ire in this regard was focused increasingly on the prospect of Georgia and Ukraine becoming NATO members.”<sup>197</sup> The idea that NATO would expand not just up to the borders of Russia herself, but also into states which Russia saw as within their sphere of influence for nearly three hundred years may have been too great a perceived injustice for Putin to take.

Putin would now begin his warnings to the US and the world of his displeasure with the current state, and hinting toward the use of his newly consolidated power. In 2006, speaking before his national assembly (the combined houses of the Duma and the Federal Council, akin to the US’ state of the union address) Putin said, “far from everyone has abandoned the old bloc mentality and the prejudices inherited from the era of global confrontation despite the great changes that have taken place. This is also a great hindrance in working together to find suitable responses to the common problems we face.”<sup>198</sup> Putin, alluding to the expansion of NATO as a remnant of the “old bloc mentality” and the counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan as “common problems we face”, was issuing his first message to the west – further NATO expansion will not be tolerated. Putin did not hang his speech on the single complaint, he continued with, “key disarmament issues are all but off the international agenda, and yet it is too early to speak of an end to the arms race. What’s more, the arms race has entered a new spiral today with the achievement of new levels of technology that raise the danger of the emergence of a whole arsenal of so-called destabilizing weapons.”<sup>199</sup>

Putin’s warnings would truly take center stage in 2007 at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. He said, without specifically citing the US, “I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. [...] What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilization.”<sup>200</sup> He continued with, “and of course this is extremely dangerous. It results in the fact that no one feels safe. I want to emphasize this – no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that will protect them. Of course such a policy stimulates an arms race.”<sup>201</sup>

Of note, Putin holds many of the bygone Soviet principles of security to be truths. Specifically called out in Munich, Putin shows that he believes unipolarity is a naturally unstable

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<sup>196</sup> Drum, Kevin, et al. “Putin: Eastern Ukraine Is Really ‘Novorossiia.’” *Mother Jones*, 24 June 2017, [www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/04/putin-eastern-ukraine-really-novorossiia/](http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/04/putin-eastern-ukraine-really-novorossiia/).

<sup>197</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush's Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 99.

<sup>198</sup> Cimbala, Stephen J. *The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy & War*. 1st ed. Washington, D.C.: Potomac, 2010. Print. Pg. 118.

<sup>199</sup> Cimbala, Stephen J. *The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy & War*. 1st ed. Washington, D.C.: Potomac, 2010. Print. Pg. 117.

<sup>200</sup> “Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy.” *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 12 Feb. 2007, [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on).

<sup>201</sup> “Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy.” *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 12 Feb. 2007, [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on).



system. A belief that centers on the fact that a unipolar system lacks checks on the superpower atop the system where as a bipolar or multipolar system keeps all, including the superpowers at its top, in check through the “presupposition of the enemy”.<sup>202</sup> The theory rests on the idea that the superpowers atop the bipolar or multipolar system exist in a state of “priori hostility” – a state where each side is “shackled to a continuation of the mutual hostage based on mutual deterrence that characterized the Cold War so that it cannot act unilaterally.”<sup>203</sup> In Munich, Putin explained, “The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN.”<sup>204</sup>

In a second warning that Putin does not respect the recent actions of NATO, he alludes to the continued enlargement. “And now they are trying to impose new dividing lines and walls on us. These walls may be virtual but they are nevertheless dividing, ones that cut through our continent.”<sup>205</sup> Judging by Putin’s belief of bipolarity “they” can only refer to the US, the enemy in the system. In claiming the walls to be “virtual”, Putin is simply saying that in lieu of concrete structures, like the Berlin Wall erected by the Soviet Union, these dividing lines are along alliances, treaties, and “spheres of influence”.

In 2008, Putin would find a reason to use his acquired power. In April of 2008, Georgia and Ukraine were told that their MAPs for NATO membership would be forthcoming later that year. Even without Russian interference, the approval of Georgia would have been a difficult proposition. In the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russian troops, branded as “peacekeepers” had been stationed previously under the purpose of “ensuring ethnic Russian’s safety”. When Georgian forces moved to quell growing tensions in South Ossetia, the Russians reported that their Peacekeepers had suffered casualties at the hands of the Georgians.<sup>206</sup> At this point, Russia deployed a much larger contingent of troops into the region, deployed the Black Sea Fleet to support, and began the overt mission of “restoring the peace”. Albeit not covertly, but surely not under the original intent of their mission, Russia forces began to destroy Georgian forces’ seized military equipment. Additionally, in August of 2008, the Russian Federation recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and began formal diplomatic relationships with both.<sup>207</sup> These two actions crushed Georgia’s hopes of receiving a MAP, since Georgia could no longer attest it was upholding two requirements to NATO membership, namely that it had no outstanding border disputes and that it could contribute militarily to NATO activities.<sup>208</sup> Putin had successfully stopped NATO’s enlargement towards Russia’s borders, at least in the south.

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<sup>202</sup> Cimbala, Stephen J. *The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy & War*. 1st ed. Washington, D.C.: Potomac, 2010. Print. Pg. 129.

<sup>203</sup> Cimbala, Stephen J. *The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy, Strategy & War*. 1st ed. Washington, D.C.: Potomac, 2010. Print. Pg. 130.

<sup>204</sup> “Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy.” *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 12 Feb. 2007, [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on).

<sup>205</sup> “Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy.” *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 12 Feb. 2007, [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html?noredirect=on).

<sup>206</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush’s Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 101.

<sup>207</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush’s Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 101.

<sup>208</sup> Murray, Donette, Brown, David, and Smith, Martin A. *George W. Bush’s Foreign Policies: Principles and Pragmatism*. 2018. Print. Contemporary Security Studies. Pg. 101.

### *Conclusions*

Vladimir Putin's consolidation of power has been nothing short of methodical. His ability in the first four years of his presidency to seize control of industry, information flows, the legislative process, and the military was a highly orchestrated and calculated undertaking. Further, if any question as to the level of control Putin was actually able to seize within the Russian Federation existed, his words in 2006 to his Federal Assembly and in 2007 to the Munich Conference on Security Policy should have served to quash doubts. Additionally, his words clearly showed to what international norms and values he was willing to commit the force of his Federation's power, those to which he was not.

The Russian Federation's actions in Georgia also stand as a striking example of the capability of the Federation to disrupt or outright block the actions of the west. Putin holds firm that unilateralism, or at least any system that doesn't support Russian interests as of the highest levels of consideration, as inherently destabilizing. NATO's enlargement to bordering states of the Russian Federation and therefore into its "sphere of influence" historically is clearly a violation of his bipolar system view.

From 2000-2008, Putin consolidated vast amounts of power within the Russian Federation, distorting the democracy that it attests to being. Further, Putin moved so quickly in this period that he was able to not just centralize this power, but also wield it against the west's intentions by subverting Georgia's hopes of joining the NATO alliance. Amazingly, regardless of the similarities between the 2008 Georgia and 2014 Ukraine affairs, most of the west would not see the later coming and would stand in amazement as the Russian Federation once again exerted its influence in a state which it sees "Novorossiia", by creating a de facto territorial dispute and by destroying or seizing large caches of military equipment.

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